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The Entity Attorney-Client Privilege Meets
the Twenty-First Century: Rethinking
Functional Equivalent Analysis in the Time
of a Nonemployee Workforce
Grace M. Giesel*
ABSTRACT
Courts have struggled with whether an entity’s attorney-client
privilege can protect communications between the entity’s lawyer and a
nonemployee who has information the entity’s lawyer needs to best advise
the entity. The nonemployee might be a former employee. But
increasingly in recent times, the nonemployee is an individual who was
never an entity employee. Corporations and other entities have
incorporated nonemployees in their economic enterprises in all sorts of
roles—roles
employees
may
have
held
in
the
past.
Many courts have accepted that the privilege can apply to communications
involving former employees.
When faced with nonemployees who are not former employees, some
courts have used a functional equivalent analysis to decide whether the
entity’s privilege protects nonemployee communications. Some courts
have applied this doctrine so that a nonemployee cannot be a
representative of the entity client unless the nonemployee is the functional
equivalent of an entity employee, focusing on whether the nonemployee
has traits, that, in these courts’ sometimes misguided opinion, are traits of
employees. Some courts have required that the nonemployee have an even
narrower set of traits that, if required of employees, would be incompatible
with the accepted reach of the privilege for employees.
These approaches are flawed. A functional equivalent analysis that
focuses on required traits of an entity employee in an employment law
sense is becoming more and more useless as each day of the twenty-first
century unfolds. The reality of entities of the twenty-first century is that
nonemployees often have roles that employees had in the past. In addition,
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traits of employees, especially in post-pandemic times, may not match an
employee definition based on earlier times. In any case, characteristics of
the nonemployee that are important for employment law purposes
generally do not relate logically with the entity’s attorney-client privilege
and its underlying rationale. In addition, the relationship of the functional
equivalent analysis, as many courts have applied it, to agency principles is
murky at best.
A rational functional equivalent analysis consistent with the goals
and rationale of the entity attorney-client privilege must focus on two
issues. First, is the nonemployee a source of information integral to the
entity lawyer’s representation of the entity? Second, does the
nonemployee have a significant relationship with the entity and the
matter—a relationship of closeness similar to the relationship an employee
has to an employer? The focus is not on whether the nonemployee is the
functional equivalent of an employee. The question is whether the
nonemployee’s relationship with the entity is the functional equivalent of
an employee’s relationship with the entity. What this sort of relationship
might look like will vary from case to case. Economic entities of the postpandemic twenty-first century are many and varied; their method of
staffing and pursuing their economic goals are varied as well. A focus on
the significance of the relationship provides consistency of analysis for all
nonemployees, whether they be former employees or other types of
nonemployees. The analysis is consistent with the goals of the entity
privilege and can be applied to the many forms entities take in the future.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Courts have long agreed that corporations and other entities enjoy an
attorney-client privilege.1 Like individuals, corporations and other entities
can communicate with their attorneys in confidence for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice without fear that a court may compel disclosure of
the communications. But the only way an entity like a corporation can
communicate with counsel is through an individual, a representative of the
entity, who communicates with the entity’s counsel. Who might be such a
representative for the purpose of an entity’s privilege? Who can talk with
the lawyer for the entity and have the conversation be protected by the
entity’s privilege?
The United States Supreme Court in 1981 decided Upjohn Company
v. United States,2 clarifying that a corporation’s privilege can apply, not
only when the corporation’s attorney communicates with employees who
are “control group” members3—generally, inhabitants of the “c-suite” of
today4 —but also when the entity’s lawyer communicates with lower-level

1. See United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318 (1915); see
also John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 444 (1982).
2. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
3. Id. at 391. The Upjohn opinion refers to the “control group” because the lower
court had determined that only members of Upjohn Company’s “control group” could be
a representative of Upjohn. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
had held that “‘only the senior management, guiding and integrating the several operations,
. . . can be said to possess an identity analogous to the corporation as a whole.’” Id. at 390
(quoting United States v. Upjohn, Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th Cir. 1979)).
4. In the 2020s, such control group members might be referred to as members of the
“c-suite.” “‘C-suite’ employees are executive-level managers of an entity.” Andrew
Bloomenthal, C-Suite, INVESTOPEDIA (July 21, 2021), https://bit.ly/3ksemd1. The chief
executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), chief operating officer (COO), chief
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employees. This is true if the entity lawyer needs those communications
to gain information to properly advise the entity client so that the client
may better conform its behavior to the law.5 The individual’s particular
employee relationship with the entity, evaluated by considering factors
discussed in the Upjohn opinion, along with the employee’s possession of
information vital to the lawyer’s legal advice to the entity, justifies
recognition of the employee, regardless of job title, as a representative of
the entity client for purposes of the entity’s attorney-client privilege.6
When a lawyer for a corporation or other entity and such an employee with
the relevant information communicate, the employee communicates as a
representative of the entity and the entity’s privilege protects that
communication. If the lawyer has been clear that the lawyer does not
represent the individual separately, the individual has no claim of
individual privilege; the only privilege at issue is that of the entity.7
After the Supreme Court’s Upjohn opinion, at least as a matter of
federal law, an entity’s employee, regardless of status, could be a
representative of the entity when communicating with an entity lawyer if
information officer (CIO), and Chief Legal Officer or General Counsel are generally Csuite employees. See id.
5. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (discussing rationale); see also infra Part IV
(discussing the Upjohn case).
6. The Court noted that the employees communicated with the corporation’s counsel
as the superiors of the employees has directed and that they did so knowing they were doing
so for the purpose of obtaining legal advice for the corporation. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at
394. The Court noted that the employees had key information that members of the control
group did not have and communicated with the corporation’s counsel about matters within
the scope of their employment duties. See id. In addition, the Court noted that the
communications were always treated as confidential. See id. While a much rarer situation,
it is also possible that the attorney may need to communicate with an employee, even the
lower-level employee, to convey legal advice. This situation is probably very rare because
in the vast majority of situations the attorney can talk with higher-ranking employees and
those employees can convey the information to the lower ranks.
7. To avoid any argument that the individual has a privilege that the individual
controls, the lawyer for the entity must very clearly explain to the individual that the lawyer
is the lawyer for the entity and does not represent the individual. A recent high-profile
example of a claim of individual privilege in the midst of an entity representation occurred
in the government’s case against Elizabeth Holmes, the former chief executive of nowdefunct Theranos. Holmes claimed that David Boies and the law firm of Boies, Schiller
Flexner LLP represented her individually in addition to representing the entity, Theranos.
See USA v. Holmes, 18-cr-00258-EJD-1 (NC), 2021 WL 2309980, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June
3, 2021). Holmes thus claimed her individual attorney-client privilege protected certain
communications and could not be compelled absent her individual consent. See id. The
court rejected this claim. See id.
For a discussion of situations in which the individual might have a claim of individual
privilege, see Grace M. Giesel, Upjohn Warnings, the Attorney-Client Privilege, and
Principles of Lawyer Ethics: Achieving Harmony, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 109, 110 (2010)
(discussing when the corporation’s attorney might reasonably be believed by the individual
to represent the individual such that the communications might be privileged). See In re
Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (setting
standard for finding that corporation’s lawyer also represents the individual officer).
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that employee has information the lawyer needs to represent the entity and
in light of the factors discussed in the Upjohn opinion.8 The unresolved
question after Upjohn was whether communications between
nonemployees and the entity’s lawyer are protected by the entity’s
attorney-client privilege.
When the nonemployee is a former employee of the corporation,
many courts have held that the entity’s privilege protects that
nonemployee’s communications with the entity’s lawyer without
substantive discussion of the issue.9 But when courts have confronted the
reach of the entity’s privilege when the nonemployee has never been an
employee of the entity and is involved in the entity’s enterprise, perhaps
in an independent contractor role, the courts have struggled with a rational
analytical framework.
This struggle is problematic because the organizational behavior of
entities, especially economic enterprises, has not been static in the years
since the Upjohn opinion. Especially in the twenty-first century, entities
in the world marketplace often use nonemployees in roles that were
employee roles in the past. The stereotype of an entity having distinct
boundaries is not as common in today’s marketplace as it might have been
just a few years ago.10 Nonemployees now provide all sorts of services to
all sorts of entities.11
As the involvement of nonemployees has become more pervasive,
entity internal investigations by entity attorneys are evermore
commonplace.12 These investigations can be mundane, such as an
investigation resulting from a slip-and-fall event, or they can be highprofile, headline-grabbing matters that affect the very existence of an
entity.13
8. While Upjohn involved a corporation, its teachings apply to other sorts of entities
such as government units. See, e.g., All. Constr. Sols., Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 54 P.3d 861,
867–71 (Colo. 2002) (applying Upjohn’s teachings to the Colorado Department of
Corrections, a state government unit).
9. See infra Part V (discussing courts’ treatments of former employees).
10. Some courts have recognized this shift. See, e.g., In re Flonase Antitrust Litig.,
879 F. Supp. 2d 454, 460 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (“‘corporations increasingly conduct their
business not merely through regular employees but also through a variety of independent
contractors retained for specific purposes’” (quoting EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 269 (A.B.A. eds., 5th
ed. 2007))).
11. See infra Part II (discussing the shifting role of nonemployees).
12. See generally Douglas R. Richmond, Navigating the Lawyering Minefield of
Internal Investigations, 63 VILL. L. REV. 617 (2018) (discussing the everyday nature of
investigations and a variety of issues that arise in internal investigations, including
privilege).
13. An example of a high-profile investigation is the investigation that resulted from
claims that Baylor University football players had sexually assaulted women and that the
University had responded inappropriately. See Doe 1 v. Baylor Univ., 335 F.R.D. 476,
481–83 (W.D. Tex. 2020). Baylor’s Board of Regents engaged a law firm to investigate

470

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 126:2

In this environment, nonemployees involved with an entity may have
information an entity lawyer needs to properly represent the entity client.
The question of whether an entity attorney’s conversation with such a
nonemployee enjoys the protection of the entity’s attorney-client privilege
looms large.14 Might a court view a nonemployee as a representative of an
Baylor’s response to Title IX and related situations. See id. at 481. A lesser profile
investigation is that in United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009). In Ruehle,
Broadcom Corporation had been identified by an investor rights group as having
inappropriately backdated stock. See Ruehle, 583 F.3d at 602. Broadcom engaged outside
counsel to investigate the allegations. See id.
14. This Article addresses whether a nonemployee can be a representative of entity
client for purposes of the entity attorney-client privilege. There are two other very different
claims that are sometimes also asserted when nonemployees are involved. Litigants
sometimes assert that the communications involving the nonemployee are privileged by
virtue of the Kovel doctrine or the common interest doctrine. See, e.g., United States v.
Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Patel, 509 F. Supp. 3d 1334 (S.D. Fla.
2020); 10X Genomics, Inc. v. Celsee, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 3d 334 (D. Del. 2020). With both
these doctrines, the claim is that the inclusion of a third party such as the nonemployee
does not prevent application of the attorney-client privilege and does not waive the
privilege that otherwise attaches. The usual rule of privilege is that the presence of a
stranger to the attorney-client relationship at the time of the communication or later sharing
a privileged communication with a stranger to the relationship destroys the privilege
because it destroys the required confidentiality. See In re Chevron Corp., 650 F.3d 278,
289 (3d Cir. 2011) (showing the presence of third party destroys possibility of privilege
protection); see also In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“[V]oluntarily disclosing privileged documents to third parties will generally destroy the
privilege.”).
The Kovel doctrine is named after United States v. Kovel. See Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922. The
Kovel doctrine extends the privilege to third parties who are “necessary, or at least highly
useful, for the effective consultation” as a translator would be necessary if the attorney and
client did not speak the same language. Id. In Kovel, a law firm represented a client
regarding tax matters. See id. at 919. A grand jury subpoenaed an accountant employed by
the law firm. See id. The accountant asserted the client’s attorney-client privilege. See id.
The court stated that an accountant, depending on the particular facts of the situation, might
be like an interpreter, a third party “necessary, or at least highly useful, for the effective
consultation between the client and the lawyer which the privilege is designed to permit.”
Id. at 922. The court stated that communications between the accountant and the client
outside the presence of the lawyer could be privileged “if the lawyer has directed the client,
either in the specific case or generally, to tell his story in the first instance to an accountant
engaged by the lawyer, who is then to interpret it so that the lawyer may better give legal
advice.” Id. For an example of a Kovel claim that a court accepted, see generally Sampedro
v. Silver Point Cap., L.P., 818 F. App’x. 14 (2d Cir. 2020). For an example of a Kovel
claim that a court rejected, see generally Diamond Resorts U.S. Collection Dev., LLC v.
U.S. Consumer Att’ys, P.A., 519 F. Supp. 3d 1184 (S.D. Fla. 2021). But see U.S. ex rel.
Wollman v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., Inc., 475 F. Supp. 3d 45, 66 (D. Mass. 2020) (noting that a
Kovel doctrine claim and a claim that the third party is a representative of the entity client).
Occasionally, a party may claim that communications involving a nonemployee are
protected by the common interest doctrine. This is a claim that the nonemployee shares a
common legal interest with the entity and thus there is no waiver resulting from the
presence of the nonemployee during communications with the entity lawyer or attorneyclient communications shared with the nonemployee. See, e.g., Patel, 509 F. Supp. 3d at
1338 (holding that no common interest for a variety of third parties); see also 10X
Genomics, 505 F. Supp. 3d at 337 (holding that common interest exception does not apply
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entity for privilege purposes such that the entity’s privilege protects the
attorney’s communication with that nonemployee?15
For example, an attorney for a hospital being sued for negligence
regarding a patient’s treatment needs to talk with everyone involved in the
patient’s treatment at the hospital so that the attorney can render proper
legal advice to the hospital regarding its liability and defense. Federal
courts and state courts following Upjohn would apply the hospital’s
attorney-client privilege to protect communications involving the
hospital’s attorney and nurses employed by the hospital at the time of the
communication who have information about the patient’s treatment.16
Many courts would also apply the hospital’s attorney-client privilege to
protect that attorney’s communications with nurses who were hospital
employees at the time of the incident and have information about the
incident, but who are former hospital employees at the time they
communicate with the hospital’s attorney.17
to communications in acquisition process). Communications involving corporate insiders
who are nonemployees usually do not fit within the parameters of this doctrine because the
third parties do not usually share a legal common interest with the entity. See generally
Grace M. Giesel, End the Experiment: The Attorney-Client Privilege Should Not Protect
Communications in the Allied Lawyer Setting, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 475 (2012) (discussing
the common interest doctrine).
15. The privilege application would, of course, also depend on whether the other
requirements of the privilege are satisfied. In an internal investigation, one of the more
substantial privilege hurdles is proving that the investigation was for the purpose of legal
advice. Some courts require proof that the investigation report and accompanying
documents would not have existed if the corporation had not needed legal advice. See, e.g.,
Guo Wengui v. Clark Hill, PLC, 338 F.R.D. 7, 13–14 (D.D.C. 2021); In re Experian Data
Breach Litig., SACV 15-1592 AG, 2017 WL 4325583, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2017);
In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., MDL No. 14-2522, 2015 WL
6777384, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Oct. 23, 2015); see also Thomas E. Spahn, Privilege and Work
Product Protection for Corporate Investigations After Clark Hill: Part IV, CORP. COUNS.
BUS. J. (May 24, 2021), https://bit.ly/3EM8x25.
16. The Supreme Court in Upjohn stated that communications between the
corporation’s employees and the corporation’s lawyer can be privileged by the
corporation’s privilege. See infra Part IV (discussing Upjohn); see also In re Kellogg
Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 757–58 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom., United
States ex rel. Barko v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 574 U.S. 1122 (2015) (reasoning that
privilege can apply to communications involving employees and lawyer for the corporation
that are a part of an internal investigation of alleged illegal activities by the corporation).
17. The Supreme Court in Upjohn did not decide whether this privilege extended to
conversations with former employees. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394 n.3; see also infra Part
IV.C (discussing the fact that this question was not decided). Even so, many courts have
applied the privilege when the corporation’s attorney communicated with former
employees. See, e.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Procs. in Petroleum Prod. Antitrust Litig.,
658 F.2d 1355, 1361 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom., California v. Standard Oil
Co. of Cal., 455 U.S. 990 (1982) (“Former employees, as well as current employees, may
possess the relevant information needed by corporate counsel to advise the client.”); In re
Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 606 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing the fact that privilege can apply when
corporate lawyer communicates with former employees); In re General Motors LLC
Ignition Switch Litig., 80 F. Supp. 3d 521, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[D]istrict courts in this
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Should the hospital’s privilege protect communications between the
hospital’s attorney and nurses who have information about the incident,
were part of the treatment team, but who were never hospital employees?
These nurses might be employees of a third-party entity that has contracted
with the hospital to provide nurses with specialized training to assist in
staffing the hospital. They might simply be individual independent
contractor workers. Perhaps they work alongside hospital employees and
other nonemployees for months, or even years, treating hospital patients.
Many courts have agreed that such nonemployees can be
representatives of the client for purposes of the privilege.18 Some courts,
to identify these nonemployees, have applied an analysis that recognizes
that a nonemployee of an entity can be a representative of the entity for
purposes of the entity’s attorney-client privilege if that nonemployee is the
“functional equivalent” of an employee and has information the entity’s
lawyer needs to render proper advice to the entity.19 Some courts have
interpreted this functional equivalent analysis to be an analysis of whether
Circuit have consistently held that the privilege also extends to ‘conversations between
corporate counsel and former employees of the corporation, so long as the discussion
related to the former employee’s conduct and knowledge gained during employment.’”)
(quoting In re Refco Inc. Sec. Litig., 2012 WL 678139, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2012));
Vegnani v. Medlogix, LLC, Civil No. 19-11291-LTS, 2020 WL 5634349, at *2 (D. Mass.
Sept. 21, 2020) (“Those courts which have addressed whether the privilege extends to
former employees have largely concluded that it does, including two courts in this
District.”); see also infra Part V (discussing courts’ treatments of former employees).
Other courts have decided not to view former employees as representatives of exemployers for purposes of the privilege. See Newman v. Highland School Dist. No. 203,
381 P.3d 1188, 1193 (Wash. 2016) (en banc) (refusing to extend the entity’s privilege to
communications involving the lawyer for the entity and individuals who had been
employees at the time of the incident being investigated but no longer employees at the
time of the communications); see also Douglas R. Richmond, The Attorney-Client
Privilege and Former Employees, 70 CATH. U. L. REV. 39, 54–55 (2021); PAUL R. RICE ET
AL., THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 4:18 (2020) (discussing
former employees); infra Part V.B (discussing Newman decision).
18. See, e.g., Hudock v. LG Elec. U.S.A., Inc., Case No. 0:16-cv-1220-JRT-KMM,
2019 WL 5692290, at *7 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2019) (finding that communications of
nonemployees were protected by the entity’s privilege); Dialysis Clinic, Inc. v. Medley,
567 S.W.3d 314, 324–25 (Tenn. 2019) (finding that communications of nonemployees
were protected by the entity’s privilege).
19. This approach, a creation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 938 (8th Cir. 1994), was an attempt to follow
Upjohn’s theoretical underpinnings and analysis by focusing on the function of the
individual vis-à-vis the entity and the goals of the privilege in evaluating the situation of a
nonemployee. See infra Part VII.A (discussing Bieter).
See, e.g., Berisha v. Lawson, 973 F.3d 1304, 1318 (11th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.
Ct. 2424 (July 2, 2021) (mem.) (finding that nonemployee’s communications with the
corporation’s attorney are protected by the corporation’s attorney-client privilege); United
States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2010); Bieter, 16 F.3d at 938; Harvey v. Great
Circle, No. 4:19-CV-902-NAB, 2020 WL 6544237, at *13 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 6, 2020);
Hermanson v. MultiCare Health Sys., Inc., 475 P.3d 484, 490 (Wash. 2020); Frank v.
Morgans Hotel Grp. Mgmt. LLC, 116 N.Y.S.3d 889, 896 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020).
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the nonemployee is the functional equivalent of an employee as an
employee might be viewed for purposes of employment law. With such an
approach, whether the entity’s privilege applies to a nonemployee’s
communications with an entity’s lawyer hinges upon whether the
nonemployee possesses characteristics that, in the court’s view, are typical
of employees. For some courts, the nonemployees must match a specific
type of employee, even though the characteristics may not further the
purposes of the privilege, and, in fact, may frustrate privilege goals
enunciated in Upjohn.20 These courts recognize a nonemployee as a
representative of the entity client only if that nonemployee “looks like” the
court’s view of an employee or a subset of employees, regardless of the
importance of the information that nonemployee possesses or the
closeness of the nonemployee’s relationship to the entity and the entity’s
enterprise.21 Characteristics that courts suppose are traits of employees are
not necessarily characteristics of employees of the twenty-first century.
They are certainly suspect in the post-pandemic world. For example, postpandemic employees may not work at the location of the entity.22 Yet,
some courts focus on work location.23
The functional equivalent analysis discussed by some courts also
seems to ignore that, traditionally, anyone in a principal-agent relationship
with the client in an attorney-client setting can be a representative of the
client for privilege purposes. This is true for individual clients as well as
entity clients. A nonemployee can be a representative of the entity client
because that nonemployee is an agent of the principal, the entity.24 Being
20. See infra Part VII.B (discussing, among other cases, Export-Import Bank of the
United States v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., 232 F.R.D. 103, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (requiring
that the nonemployee have a “key corporate job”)); see also Frank, 116 N.Y.S.3d at 892
(analyzing criteria such as whether a third-party has “primary responsibility for a key
corporate job and could make decisions on the corporation’s behalf,” and whether a thirdparty has “a continuous and close working relationship with the company’s principals on
matters critical to the company’s position in litigation”); In re Dealer Mgmt. Sys. Antitrust
Litig., 335 F.R.D. 510, 518 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (declining to adopt the doctrine but stated that
the nonemployee did not, in any case, satisfy the elements of key corporate job, continuous
and close relationship with principals on critical matters).
21. See, e.g., People v. McQueen, 451825/2019, 2020 WL 1878107, *3 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Cnty. Feb. 21, 2020) (noting “the third-party must assume the functions and duties of
a full-time employee”); Frank, 116 N.Y.S.3d at 892 (noting that inquiry is whether a
contractor performs “the functions and duties of [a] full-time employee” and has become
“a de facto employee”).
22. See infra Part II (discussing work location).
23. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wollman v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 475 F. Supp. 3d 45,
68 (D. Mass. 2020) (discussing a nonemployee that had his own office not at the corporate
entity’s location, and had other clients).
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 (AM. L. INST.
2000). Kentucky Rule of Evidence 503 defines “representative of the client” as follows:
(A) A person having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on
advice thereby rendered on behalf of the client; or
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an agent is not the same as being “like” an employee.25 Courts applying
the functional equivalent doctrine are not clear on how the functional
equivalent analysis relates to agency status when the question of attorneyclient privilege application involves nonemployees of various sorts.26 If a
court is using its functional equivalent analysis as the only test of when a
nonemployee can be a representative of an entity client for purposes of the
entity’s attorney-client privilege, and if that test is a narrow one focusing
on the court’s view of employee-like traits, a nonemployee who may be in
a principal-agent relationship with the entity is not the functional
equivalent of an entity employee and is therefore not a representative of
the entity client for purposes of the entity client’s attorney-client privilege.
Such is a very flawed result.
This Article suggests that a proper identification of nonemployees
who are representatives of the entity client for purposes of the privilege
must be grounded in a more conceptual functional equivalent analysis. The
Upjohn opinion clarified that employees, even low-level ones, can be
representatives of the corporate entity client if those employees have
information the entity’s attorney needs to properly represent the entity
client and consideration of other factors indicate that recognizing the
employee as a representative of the entity client for purposes of the entity’s
privilege further the goals of the privilege.27 Likewise, and for the same
reason, an entity’s privilege should apply to a nonemployee if the
following is true:
1. the nonemployee has a significant relationship with the entity and
the matter that is the subject of the entity’s need for legal advice; and
2. the nonemployee has the information necessary for the entity’s
attorney to provide proper legal advice.

(B) Any employee or representative of the client who makes or receives a
confidential communication:
(i) In the course and scope of his or her employment;
(ii) Concerning the subject matter of his or her employment; and
(iii) To effectuate legal representation for the client.
KY. R. EVID. 503(a)(2). At least regarding this rule, an employee is but one type of
representative of the client; see also infra Part VI (discussing Restatement view of agent
as representative of the client).
25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006) (establishing
that the principal “manifests . . . that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject
to the principal’s control” and the agent agrees to this arrangement).
26. See, e.g., In re Dealer Mgmt. Sys. Antitrust Litig., 335 F.R.D. 510, 517–18 (N.D.
Ill. 2020) (discussing functional equivalence but not agency); Frank, 116 N.Y.S.3d at 891–
93 (same). In contrast, in the Washington Supreme Court, the dissent in Hermanson v.
MultiCare Health Sys., Inc., 475 P.3d 484, 493–94 (Wash. 2020) addresses agency and
functional equivalence but as defining unrelated categories of nonemployees.
27. See infra Part IV (discussing Upjohn).
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The functional equivalent analysis should not require that the
nonemployee share the characteristics of an employee, but rather that the
nonemployee have a “significant relationship”28 with the entity and the
matter at issue. The important factor is not that the nonemployee is the
functional equivalent of an employee; the important factor is that the
nonemployee’s relationship with the entity is the functional equivalent to
the close and significant relationship an employee has with an employer.
A focus on the significance of the relationship for privilege purposes
eliminates the need in many cases for a separate agency analysis. An
agency analysis, just as is true with a focus on employee characteristics,
can unduly complicate the privilege analysis with factors unimportant to
the purpose and rationale of the privilege.29 Nonemployees can be agents
of the entity though they are independent contractors30 or even employees
of other entities, 31 but agency analysis is unnecessary in light of the reality
of a significant relationship with the entity. As the Arizona Supreme Court
stated in Samaritan Foundation v. Goodfarb:32 “[A]n approach that

28. In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 938 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting “nonemployees who
possess a ‘significant relationship to the client and the client’s involvement in the
transaction that is the subject of the legal services’”); see also Berisha v. Lawson, 973 F.3d
1304, 1318 (11th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2424 (2021) (mem.) (quoting Bieter
regarding the requirement of a “significant relationship”); Hermanson, 475 P.3d at 490
(quoting Bieter regarding the requirement of a “significant relationship”).
29. Courts may not truly grasp agency as it applies in today’s world and in these
contexts. For example, many definitions of agency require the principal to have the right
to “control” the agent. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006)
(stating that the principal “manifests . . . that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf
and subject to the principal’s control” and the agent agrees to this arrangement); see also
Boltz-Rubenstein v. Bank of Am., N.A., 624 B.R. 756, 762 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2021)
(discussing the fact that both parties agree to the relationship and the principal controls the
situation but all aspects of the agency can be implied from circumstances and conduct). In
the context of the twenty-first century work environment, what is meant by “control”? As
the Introduction to the Restatement (Third) of Agency states:
The common-law definition of a relationship of agency uses concepts, such as
“manifestation” and “control,” that embrace a wide spectrum of meanings and
that in this application are highly fact-specific. As a result, agency law covers a
broader set of relationships than might be expected. Manifestations may be made
indirectly and in generalized ways, and legal implications do not necessarily
depend on precise statements made to specifically identified individuals.
Likewise, a principal’s right of control, which entitles the principal to give
interim instructions or directions to the agent, is a broadly drawn concept.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, intro. (AM. L. INST. 2006).
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. d (AM.
L. INST. 2020) (explaining that independent contractors can be agents).
31. Agency can reach the employees of a third-party entity that is an agent of the host
corporation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. d
(AM. L. INST. 2020).
32. 862 P.2d 870 (Ariz. 1993).
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focuses solely upon the status of the communicator fails to adequately
meet the objectives sought to be served by the attorney-client privilege.”33
Of course, any nonemployee who has been authorized to act on behalf
of the entity principal in matters relevant to the privilege application and
who otherwise satisfies the requirements of agency is an entity agent. Such
a nonemployee is therefore a representative of the entity for privilege
purposes. The agency relationship is certainly evidence of the significant
relationship needed for the functional equivalent analysis. But the
touchstone of the functional equivalent analysis rests on the significance
of the relationship, whatever its form. An individual can be a
representative of the client entity for privilege purposes if that individual’s
relationship is that of an employee, an agent, or an independent contractor
who otherwise has a significant relationship with the entity.34
Applying the functional equivalent analysis as described in this
Article allows the privilege to evolve along with the evolution of entity
behavior. Doing so does not cause the privilege to be too expansive. In
1990, the entity privilege would have protected a communication between
an employee nurse who was part of the treatment team in the example
above. In 2021, it can protect that same communication between a
nonemployee nurse who was part of the treatment team and the hospital
attorney who is investigating the patient’s claim of negligence.
Courts should find the suggested functional equivalent analysis more
manageable. The analysis should allow courts to more reliably and
consistently discern situations of proper privilege application. While
analyzing degrees of relationship requires the exercise of careful judicial
judgment, judges are perfectly capable of making this determination.35 As
the Second Circuit once said in an earlier time when dealing with a
different facet of the privilege:
We realize also that the line we have drawn will not be so easy to apply
as the simpler positions urged on us by the parties—the district judges
will scarcely be able to leave the decision of such cases to computers;

33. Id. at 874.
34. See, e.g., All. Constr. Sols., Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 54 P.3d 861, 869 (Colo. 2002)
(noting an “employee, agent, or independent contractor with a significant relationship not
only to the . . . entity but also to the transaction that is the subject of the . . . entity’s need
for legal [advice]”).
35. For an example of a court exercising such judgment in concluding a public
insurance adjuster was a representative of an entity client though also a nonemployee (and
other nonemployees were not), see Am. Ins. Co. v. Pine Terrace Homeowners Ass’n, No.
20-cv-00654-DDD, 2021 WL 2036541, at *3–4 (D. Colo. May 21, 2021).
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but the distinction has to be made if the privilege is neither to be unduly
expanded nor to become a trap.36

This Article, in Part II, discusses the substantial increase in recent
years in entity reliance on nonemployees as essential pieces in the
enterprise puzzle. Part III explains the parameters of the attorney-client
privilege and, in particular, the privilege for corporations and other entities
as that privilege was applied in the time before the Supreme Court’s
Upjohn opinion. In Part IV, the Article discusses the Upjohn opinion
regarding employees as representatives of entities for purposes of the
entity’s privilege. Part V discusses courts’ treatments of former
employees, a special category of nonemployee. Part VI discusses
Restatement agency concepts. Part VII reviews courts’ applications of the
functional equivalent analysis regarding nonemployees who are not
former employees. Part VIII suggests an improved functional equivalent
analysis that can better guide courts in identifying nonemployees who
should be viewed as representatives of the entity client. This analysis
should focus on the relationship between the entity and the nonemployee
in the context of the particular dispute at issue and the information the
nonemployee has as a result of that relationship. This analysis should be a
particularized consideration of the significance of the relationship in that
context. This Article concludes in Part IX that this improved analysis
aligns with the goals and rationale of the privilege as presented in the
Upjohn opinion. The approach can accomplish the goals of the entity
attorney-client privilege in the context of the constantly changing entity
organizational behavior of the twenty-first century.
II.

THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AND ENTITY USE OF
NONEMPLOYEES

Nonemployees provide all sorts of services in today’s economic and
other enterprises. For example, corporations often turn to nonemployees
to provide human relations services or information technology services.37
In the mid-twentieth century of Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman, a
corporate entity might have had a human relations department (although
36. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922–23 (2d Cir. 1961) (discussing the fact
that inclusion of a third party does not destroy the privilege if the third party is necessary
(like a translator) for the representation to occur).
37. See G. Dautovic, 15 Must-Know Outsourcing Statistics for 2021, FORTUNLY
(Sept. 22, 2021), https://bit.ly/3AU7awd; Michael Stoler & Miles Underwood, How Much
Disruption? Deloitte Global Outsourcing Survey 2020, DELOITTE (2020),
https://bit.ly/2XJBcnt; Jessica Edgson, 27 Eye-Opening Outsourcing Statistics, CAPITAL
COUNS. (Apr. 2, 2021), https://bit.ly/3i5XpDE; Rebecca Baldridge, Best HR Outsourcing
for Small Businesses in 2021, INC. (Feb. 11, 2020), https://bit.ly/3B9otKr; Dirk DeBie, 3
Types of Outsourcing in IT: Which One is Better to Choose?, BUSINESSING (Dec. 11, 2020),
https://bit.ly/2ZjDN8n.
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perhaps called “personnel”) that handled employment-related issues.38
Today, however, many corporations enter outsourcing39 contracts with
third-party entities so that the third-party entity’s employees provide all or
many human relations services.40 The third-party entity supplants the
corporation’s human relations department entirely or provides some of its
employees to work with the corporation’s employees. Occasionally, an
entity contracts directly with an individual for services without a thirdparty employer in the mix. Yet, the entity engages the individual as an
independent contractor so that the individual is not an entity employee.41
In this economic environment, even the definition of “employee” for
purposes of employment law is fluid. Uber, Lyft, and other entities
increasingly have used staffing models in which a large portion of the
entity workforce is not within the employee classification under traditional
employment law classification schemes. Responding to the social
inequities such an approach creates when workers are not entitled to
protections available to employees,42 the California Supreme Court in
2018 adopted a classification scheme for purposes of employment law that
results in more workers earning an employee classification rather than an
independent contractor classification.43 The employee classification issue

38. See ARTHUR MILLER, DEATH OF A SALESMAN (1949).
39. Outsourcing has been described as follows:
Outsourcing is the business practice of hiring a party outside a company to
perform services or create goods that were traditionally performed in-house by
the company’s own employees and staff. Outsourcing is a practice usually
undertaken by companies as a cost-cutting measure. As such, it can affect a wide
range of jobs, ranging from customer support to manufacturing to the back office.
Outsourcing was first recognized as a business strategy in 1989 and became an
integral part of business economics throughout the 1990s.
Alexandra Twin, Outsourcing, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 29, 2021), https://bit.ly/3ERO0JJ.
40. See Baldridge, supra note 37.
41. See Michael A. Chichester, Jr. & Sophia Behnia, Covid Is Accelerating the Gig
Economy, 18 TODAY’S GEN. COUNS. 1, 14–15 (May 2021), https://bit.ly/3kA13qV.
42. See Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 5 (Cal. 2018).
The court noted that an employee has the benefit of the employer paying social security,
payroll tax, unemployment tax, state employment tax, and workers compensation
insurance. See id. The employee also has wage and hour law protections and protection
regarding working conditions. See id.
43. See Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 39 (adopting the ABC test rather than the Borello test).
With the ABC test, a worker is not an independent contractor unless the worker is free from
the company’s control and direction as to how to perform the job, the job performed is
outside the normal business activities of the employer, and the worker does the same sort
of independent work for others that the worker does for the employer. See id.; see also S.G.
Borello & Sons v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 407 (Cal. 1989) (applying a
test that is stricter regarding who is an employee).
California Assembly Bill 5 codified the ABC test. This Bill became law in 2019. California
Proposition 22 carved out exceptions for some types of workers, creating a third
classification for purposes of employment law that is somewhere between an employee
and an independent contractor and thus has some of the worker rights of an employee. See
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has been an active one on the federal level as well.44 Thus, even for
purposes of employment law, the parameters of employee status are not
clear and are not well defined.
Another shift in recent years has occurred regarding the location of
work for all workers involved in enterprises. In the past, nonemployees,
be they employees of a third-party entity or individual nonemployees, may
have worked physically in the bricks-and-mortar location of the host entity
alongside entity employees. But even before the COVID-19 pandemic
forced acceptance of and increased comfort with remote work, some
corporate employees worked remotely,45 as did nonemployees.46 Whether
a nonemployee works remotely has not been and certainly is not, going
forward, a badge of employee or employee-like status. The combination
of familiarity with remote work resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic
as well as technological innovation may result in even more remote work
arrangements involving entity employees and nonemployees alike.47

Sarah Jaffe, The Battle for the Future of “Gig” Work, VOX (May 18, 2021, 8:00 AM),
https://bit.ly/2YadFw0; see also Chichester & Behnia, supra note 41.
44. A proposed federal rule that would result in fewer determinations that workers
are independent contractors was proposed in January of 2021 but withdrawn in May of
2021. See Jim Paretti et al., DOL Withdraws Independent Contractor Regulations,
Meaning More Uncertainty for Employers, LITTLER (May 14, 2021),
https://bit.ly/38TL9RN.
45. See Chichester & Behnia, supra note 41, at 14–15 (“The benefits of using
independent contractors have given rise to the burgeoning gig economy we see today.
Technology and automation have made it easier for companies to connect directly with
independent contractors and gig workers, and to ensure that workers fit the company’s
needs.”); see also Alexandra Talty, Work from Home 2019: The Top 100 Companies for
Remote Jobs, FORBES (Jan. 15, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://bit.ly/3z2gaxc (listing companies
offering remote work pre-pandemic).
46. Sometimes remote work has involved work on different continents. See Jonathan
Webb, What is Offshoring? What is Outsourcing? Are They Different?, FORBES (July 28,
2017, 7:05 PM), https://bit.ly/2Xf3NBh; Baldridge, supra note 37 (“The ultimate means to
save a significant amount of money is to combine offshoring with outsourcing. That is
move production to a third-party that is based in an overseas location. This has been an
activity in which American corporations have been engaged for many decades.”).
47. See Chichester & Behnia, supra note 41, at 14–15 (“As companies continue to
rely on more remote workforces, they will inevitably outsource more flexible functions—
information technology, accounting, software and web development, to name a few—to
independent contractors.”); Lori Ioannou, 1 in 4 Americans Will Be Working Remotely in
2021, Upwork Survey Reveals, CNBC (Feb. 6, 2021, 12:32 PM), https://cnb.cx/3z02SBq
(finding that employees will work remotely and employers will be more likely to turn to
remote freelancers for skills that are not in-house); Kathryn Vesel, The Pandemic Forced
a Massive Remote-Work Experiment. Now Comes the Hard Part, CNN BUSINESS (Mar. 11,
2021, 8:36 AM) https://cnn.it/3z1joRV (reporting that some companies will remain 100%
remote post-pandemic; others with use a hybrid approach; others will have all employees
in the office).
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III. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. The Basics
The modern federal attorney-client privilege is largely a creature of
common law, 48 although some tangential aspects of the privilege have
become a part of the Federal Rules of Evidence.49 Some states have
codified the privilege50 while some states continue to rely on the common
law.51 The federal system has a general statement regarding the privilege
in Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 501 states that
“common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason
and experience—governs a claim of privilege unless” the Constitution, a
federal statute, or Supreme Court Rule states otherwise.52
Even though the parameters of the privilege are derived from a
variety of sources, the sources agree on the basic bounds of the privilege.
The attorney-client privilege protects certain communications involving
an attorney and that attorney’s client. Communications protected by the
privilege cannot be compelled regardless of need.53 The privilege protects
communications between attorneys and clients or their representatives,54
48. There was an effort in the late 1960s and early 1970s to explicitly codify the
definition of the privilege for purposes of federal law. The effort was unsuccessful. See
infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the proposed rule). See generally 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5471 (Kenneth W. Graham,
Jr. & Ann Murphy eds., 2021) (1986) (discussing the effort).
49. Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence became effective in 2008 and deals
with various ancillary issues related to waiver in situations such as inadvertent disclosure
of privileged communications. See FED. R. EVID. 502.
50. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 954; KRE 503; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503.
51. For example, an Indiana statute provides, in part:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, the following persons shall not be
required to testify regarding the following communications:
(1) Attorneys, as to confidential communications made to them in the course of
their professional business, and as to advice given in such cases.
....
IND. CODE § 34-46-3-1; see also Groth v. Pence, 67 N.E.3d 1104, 1118–19 (Ind. Ct. App.
2017) (discussing Indiana’s privilege scheme).
52. FED. R. EVID. 501. Rule 501 was adopted in 1974 and also clarifies that “in a civil
case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies
the rule of decision.” Id.
53. See Guo Wengui v. Clark Hill, PLC, 338 F.R.D. 7, 13 (D.D.C. 2021) (“After all,
unlike the work-product privilege, which may be overcome by a sufficient showing of
need, the attorney-client privilege is absolute.”); see also Fenceroy v. Gelita USA, Inc.,
908 N.W.2d 235, 242–43 (Iowa 2018) (“Our law recognizes that a ‘confidential
communication between an attorney and the attorney’s client is absolutely privileged from
disclosure against the will of the client.’” (quoting Shook v. City of Davenport, 497 N.W.2d
883, 886 (Iowa 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Wells Dairy, Inc. v. Am. Indus.
Refrigeration, Inc., 690 N.W.2d 38, 48 (Iowa 2004))).
54. The communication can flow from attorney to client or from client to attorney.
See, e.g., O’Gorman v. Kitchen, 20-cv-1404(LJL), 2021 WL 1292907, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 7, 2021) (“The privilege protects both the advice of the attorney to the client and the
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in confidence, for the purpose of obtaining or receiving legal advice, and
the communication cannot be in furtherance of a crime or fraud.55 The
privilege shields communications, not underlying facts that might be the
subject of the communication.56
information communicated by the client that provides a basis for giving advice.”); Attorney
General v. Facebook, Inc., 164 N.E.3d 873, 885 (Mass. 2021) (“[P]rivilege covers the flow
of confidential communications in both directions—from the attorney to the client and
from the client to the attorney.”).
55. Many courts, especially federal courts, use the definition of the privilege set forth
in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358–59 (D. Mass. 1950).
For example, the court in EFCG, Inc. v. AEC Advisors, LLC, 19-cv-8076 (RA)(BCM),
2020 WL 6378943, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2020), noted that “[u]nder federal common
law, . . . the elements of the attorney-client privilege are well-settled” and then quoted the
United Shoe definition of the privilege. Judge Wyzanski, in United Shoe, defined the
privilege as follows:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought
to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is
a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of
which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of
strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or
(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed
and (b) not waived by the client.
United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 358–59.
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers similarly provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this Restatement, the attorney-client privilege
may be invoked as provided in § 86 with respect to:
(1) a communication
(2) made between privileged persons
(3) in confidence
(4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (AM. L. INST. 2000); see
also In re Vioxx Prods. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 795 (E.D. La. 2007) (“Five elements
are common to all definitions of the attorney-client privilege: (1) an attorney, (2) a client,
(3) a communication, (4) confidentiality anticipated and preserved, and (5) legal advice or
assistance being the purpose of the communication.”).
56. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 382, 395–96 (1981), in which the
Supreme Court stated:
The privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect
disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney:
“[T]he protection of the privilege extends only to communications and not to
facts. A fact is one thing and a communication concerning that fact is an entirely
different thing. The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, ‘What
did you say or write to the attorney?’ but may not refuse to disclose any relevant
fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such
fact into his communication to his attorney.”
(quoting City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D.
Pa. 1962); see also Attorney General v. Facebook, Inc., 164 N.E.3d 873, 886 (Mass. 2021)
(suggesting that privilege protects communications but not the facts); Harris v. Hyundai
Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC, Civil Action No. 2:19-CV-919-MHT, 2021 WL 1536577, at *4
(M.D. Ala. Apr. 19, 2021) (finding that facts are not protected and communications are
protected).
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The rationale of the privilege has several layers. The privilege
enables clients to tell their lawyers everything about the matter—a “full
and frank” disclosure.57 Lawyers cannot render the best advice to their
clients without all the relevant information.58 The information disclosed
by clients allows lawyers to render the best possible advice to the clients.
An additional layer of rationale is that, as the Supreme Court in Upjohn
Company v. United States explained, this fully-informed legal advice is
necessary to “promote broader public interests in the observance of law
and the administration of justice.”59 The Upjohn Court also noted that
“[t]he privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s
being fully informed by the client.”60 Full disclosure of the client’s
situation “better enable[s] the client to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law and to present legitimate claims or defenses when
litigation arises.”61
Without doubt, in particular situations, the privilege impedes the
truth-finding process.62 However, the collective legal wisdom over the
centuries has concluded that the benefit of the privilege outweighs the cost
to truth-finding on a meta level. As the Massachusetts court in Attorney
General v. Facebook, Inc.63 stated: “We have emphasized the value of
57. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (explaining that the “purpose is to encourage full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients”).
58. This is a long-held rationale. In Annesley v. Anglesea, 17 How. St. Tr. 1139, 1237
(1743), an English court stated:
No man can conduct any of his affairs which relate to matters of law, without
employing and consulting with an attorney; even if he is capable of doing it in
point of skill, the law will not let him; and if he does not fully and candidly
disclose every thing that is in his mind, which he apprehends may be in the least
relative to the affair he consults his attorney upon, it will be impossible for the
attorney properly to serve him.
See also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege,
66 CAL. L. Rev. 1061, 1063 n.6 (1978) (discussing the Annesley case). For a more modern
statement of this aspect of the privilege rationale, see Trammell v. United States, 445 U.S.
40, 51 (1980) (“[T]he lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and
counselor to know all that relates to the client’s reasons for seeking representation if the
professional mission is to be carried out.”).
59. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; accord In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345,
360–61 (3d Cir. 2007) (as amended on Oct. 12, 2007); see also Facebook, 164 N.E.3d at
885 (quoting Comm’r of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 901 N.E.2d 1185, 1194 (Mass. 2009)).
60. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege serves the function
of promoting full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients. It thereby
encourages observance of the law and aids in the administration of justice.”).
61. United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 684 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389–90).
62. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (suggesting that privilege
is in “derogation of the search for truth”); see also 10x Genomics, Inc. v. Celsee, Inc., 505
F. Supp. 3d 334, 337 (D. Del. 2020) (noting that privilege obstructs the search for truth).
63. 164 N.E.3d 873 (Mass. 2021).
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protecting confidential attorney-client communications, as the ‘social
good derived from the proper performance of the functions of lawyers
acting for their clients . . . outweigh[s] the harm that may come from the
suppression of the evidence.’”64 Another strong statement is in RhonePoulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indemnity Company,65 in which the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated, “The privilege
encourages the client to reveal to the lawyer confidences necessary for the
lawyer to provide advice and representation. As the privilege serves the
interests of justice, it is worthy of maximum legal protection.”66
Even so, courts are wary of the effect of the privilege on the
development of the truth in particular cases. A common refrain in court
opinions is that, because of this effect on truth-finding, the privilege should
be construed narrowly.67
B. The Privilege for Entity Clients before Upjohn
1. The Courts
Courts have long applied the attorney-client privilege to entity
clients.68 The difficulty, historically, has been who, for purposes of the
privilege, is a representative of the entity client in the communication with
the attorney. Some courts, before and at the time of the Upjohn case,
applied the corporation’s attorney-client privilege, assuming all the other
requirements were satisfied, only when the communication involved a
64. Id. at 885–86 (quoting Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Servs., Inc., 870
N.E.2d 1105, 1111 (Mass. 2007)); see also Matter of In re Grand Jury Investigation, 772
N.E.2d 9, 17 (Mass. 2002) (“Considerable public benefit inures when an institution
voluntarily scrutinizes its own operations for the purpose of seeking advice from counsel
on how to comply with the law, particularly where today’s increasingly dense regulatory
terrain makes such compliance ‘hardly an instinctive matter.’” (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S.
at 392)).
65. 32 F.3d 851 (3d Cir. 1994).
66. Id. at 862 (citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; Haines v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 975 F.2d
81, 90 (3d Cir. 1992) (as amended on Sept. 17, 1992)); see also Rasby v. Pillen, 8:15-CV226, 2016 WL 4995036, at *3 (D. Neb. Sept. 19, 2016) (quoting Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 32
F.3d at 862); Nemirofsky v. Seok Ki Kim, 523 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (as
amended on Nov. 24, 2007) (quoting Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 32 F.3d at 862).
67. See, e.g., Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. CV 191552 (ABJ), 2021 WL 2652852, at * 7 (D.D.C. May 3, 2021) (explaining that attorneyclient privilege is “‘narrowly construed’” and “‘limited to those situations in which its
purposes will be served’”) (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d
854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see also Diamond Resorts U.S. Collection Dev. v. US
Consumer Att’ys, P.A., 519 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1197 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (suggesting to
construe the privilege narrowly “so as not to exceed the means necessary to support the
policy which it promotes”) (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336
(1915); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. b
(AM. L. INST. 2000) (“Extending the privilege to corporations and other organizations was
formerly a matter of doubt but is no longer questioned.”).
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member of the corporation’s control group.69 Members of the control
group were generally high-level management employees—employees
who controlled the corporate response to legal advice.70 With the control
group approach, the individual’s authority to act for the corporation was
vital and such authority usually resided with employees at the top of the
entity hierarchy.71 For example, the court in City of Philadelphia v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.,72 stated:
[T]he most satisfactory solution, . . . , is that if the employee making
the communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in a position to
control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action
which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or if
he is an authorized member of a body or group which has that
authority, then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation when he
makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the privilege would apply.73

Other courts working before the Supreme Court’s Upjohn opinion
adopted a broader view of who could be a representative of the entity client
for purposes of the entity’s privilege.74 For example, in Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,75 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit looked to whether the purpose of the communication was
for the corporation to gain legal advice from the attorney, whether a
higher-ranking employee instructed the communicating employee to
speak with the lawyer to assist the corporation in gaining legal advice from
the lawyer, and whether the subject matter of the communication between
the entity lawyer and the employee related to the subject matter of the

69. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483,
485 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (reasoning that the corporation’s attorney-client privilege can apply to
a communication between the corporation’s attorney and an employee in a position to act
upon the legal advice).
70. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. d (AM.
L. INST. 2000) (defining the control group).
71. For a discussion of the control group approach with a pre-Upjohn view, see Note,
Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 424 (1970). For a more retrospective view, see RICE, supra note 17, at §§ 4:12–13;
John W. Gergacz, The Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege, 37 A.B.A. 461, 466–67
(2021); see also Jason Batts, Rethinking Attorney-Client Privilege, 33 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1, 24–25 (2020).
72. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
73. Id. at 485.
74. See, e.g., Harper & Row Pub., Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1970),
aff’d, 400 U.S. 348 (1971); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th
Cir. 1977).
75. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970). The opinion was affirmed by an equally divided
Supreme Court without an opinion. See Decker v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 400 U.S.
348, 349 (1971).
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employee’s responsibilities for the corporation.76 This approach was called
a subject-matter approach.77
2. The Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence Defining the
Privilege Generally and the Entity Privilege in Particular
In the late 1960s, some elements of the bar sought to codify the
attorney-client privilege for purposes of federal law. While the effort was
unsuccessful regarding a rule defining the parameters of the privilege,78
the effort is nonetheless interesting with regard to the proposed treatment
of the question at hand—identifying who can speak with an entity’s
attorney as a representative of the entity client for purposes of the
privilege, and, assuming all other requirements of the privilege are
satisfied, have the entity’s attorney-client privilege protect the
communication.
The initial proposed rule in 1969 defined the term, “representative of
the client,” as follows: “A ‘representative of the client’ is one having
authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered
thereto, on behalf of the client.”79 This definition was revised for a later
version of the proposed rule by changing the “or” to an “and” so that the
definition aligned more closely with the control group approach. The
revised definition of the term, “representative of the client,” was then as
follows: “A ‘representative of the client’ is one having authority to obtain
professional legal services, and to act on advice rendered thereto, on behalf
of the client.”80 The general statement of the rule provided that a
communication between the entity’s lawyer and the entity’s
“representative” that otherwise satisfied the requirements of the privilege
was protected by the entity’s privilege.81
The final proposed version of the rule presented to the Supreme Court
omitted any definition of “representative of the client.”82 The Advisory

76. See Harper & Row, 423 F.2d at 491–92.
77. See RICE, supra note 17, at § 4:14; Gergacz, supra note 71, at § 3:71; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWS. § 73 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2000)
(describing the subject matter approach).
78. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 49, at §§ 5321, 5471 (discussing the statutory
history of Rule 503).
79. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, Rule 503(a)(3), 46 F.R.D. 77, 78 (proposed Mar. 31, 1969).
80. Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, Rule 503(a)(3), 51 F.R.D. 315, 361 (proposed 1971) (emphasis added); see
also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 48, at § 5483.
81. See id. at 47–48; Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United
States District Courts and Magistrates, Rule 5-03(a)(3), 51 F.R.D. 315, 363 (proposed
1971).
82. Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, Rule 503, 56
F.R.D. 183, 235–237 (1973).
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Committee stated that “the matter is best left to resolution by decision on
a case-by-case basis.”83 The Supreme Court approved this version of what
has become known as Rule 503,84 but Congress ultimately rejected the
proposed Rule 503 entirely, perhaps as a result of the issue of the proper
parameters of the privilege as applied to corporations and other entities.85
Rule 501 survived and simply refers back to the common law for the
privilege parameters.86
IV. THE UPJOHN CASE: THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES WHO CAN
BE A REPRESENTATIVE OF AN ENTITY CLIENT
A. The Lower Courts in the Upjohn Matter
Upjohn Corporation learned, in the process of a tax audit, that
employees of a foreign subsidiary had bribed foreign officials to secure
business. Such bribes were, of course, illegal.87 Upjohn’s General
Counsel, after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of Directors
and outside counsel, began an internal investigation.88 The Chairman sent
a letter to “[a]ll Foreign General and Area Managers” that contained a
questionnaire about the “possibly illegal” payments and stated that the
Chairman had asked Upjohn’s General Counsel to investigate the matter.89
The letter stated that everyone should treat the investigation as confidential
and that responses should be sent to the General Counsel. The General
Counsel and outside counsel interviewed the group who received the
Chairman’s letter and thirty-three others.90
After Upjohn submitted information to the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Internal Revenue Service about the internal
investigation, the Internal Revenue Service sought access to the
questionnaires, memos, and notes relating to the interviews.91 Upjohn

83. Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, Advisory
Committee’s Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 237 (1973).
84. See Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, Rule 503, 56
F.R.D. 183, 183 (1973).
85. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 48, at § 5483.
86. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (“The common law—as interpreted by United States courts
in the light of reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege unless any of the
following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; or rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court.”); see also FED. R. EVID. 502. Rule 502 was created
much later and deals with tangential issues such as inadvertent disclosure.
87. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981).
88. See id.
89. Id. at 386–87.
90. See id. at 387.
91. See id. at 387–88.
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refused.92 The district court held that Upjohn had to disclose the requested
information because Upjohn had waived any applicable privilege.93
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
rejected the lower court’s conclusion that Upjohn had waived the
privilege.94 Expressing concern that the reach of the privilege cannot be
too broad,95 the court then applied the control group test and held that
Upjohn had no privilege regarding the requested questionnaires, memos,
and notes to “the extent that the communications were made by officers
and agents not responsible for directing Upjohn’s actions in response to
legal advice . . . for the simple reason that the communications were not
the ‘client’s.’”96 In the view of the Sixth Circuit, “only the senior
management, guiding and integrating the several operations, . . . can be
said to possess an identity analogous to the corporation as a whole.”97
Because the investigation included interviews with the Chairman and the
President and other high-ranking corporate actors, the court remanded for
a determination of who might be within the control group since
communications between the attorney for the corporation and those
individuals could be protected by Upjohn’s privilege because those
individuals were likely members of the control group.98
B. The Supreme Court’s Upjohn Opinion: A Functional Approach
for Employees
The Supreme Court in Upjohn made clear that the application of the
attorney-client privilege to situations in which the attorney represents a
corporation and communicates with individuals in an effort to provide
legal advice to that entity client cannot be boiled down to “a broad rule or
series of rules to govern all conceivable future questions in this area.”99
Rather, in the Court’s view, a court must apply the privilege, as Federal
Rule of Evidence 501 states, “by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of reason and
experience.”100

92. See id. at 388.
93. See United States v. Upjohn Co., No. K77-7 Misc. CA-4, 1978 WL 1163, at *9
(W.D. Mich. Feb. 23, 1978) (“[T]he Company should be deemed to have waived the
attorney-client privilege with respect to the same matter, if indeed it ever existed.”), report
and recommendation adopted by 1978 WL 1221 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 29, 1978).
94. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 n.12 (6th Cir. 1979).
95. See id. at 1227.
96. Id. at 1225.
97. Id. at 1226.
98. See id. at 1227–28.
99. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981).
100. Id. at 389 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501).
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Addressing the rationale and purpose of the privilege, the Court
stated:
Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests
in the observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege
recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and
that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully
informed by the client.101

The Court rejected the control group approach, noting that such an
approach is too narrow because it “overlooks the fact that the privilege
exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who
can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him
to give sound and informed advice.”102 In the Court’s view, gathering the
facts relevant to a legal problem is the necessary first step in rendering
legal advice.103 Because lower-level employees may have information the
corporation’s attorney needs and yet those employees are not members of
the control group, the control group test “frustrates the very purpose of the
privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant information by
employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the
client corporation.”104 The Court stated, “[t]he narrow ‘control group test’
. . . in this case cannot, consistent with ‘the principles of the common law
as . . . interpreted . . . in the light of reason and experience,’ . . . govern the
development of the law in this area.”105
The Court concluded that Upjohn’s privilege applied to the
communications between Upjohn’s lawyers and the employees who had
the relevant information about the bribes that the lawyers needed to advise
Upjohn, regardless of the rank of those employees.106 In the Court’s view,
this application was “[c]onsistent with the underlying purposes of the
attorney-client privilege.”107
The Upjohn Court reached this result after focusing on several
specific issues. First, the Court noted that the Upjohn employees
communicated with Upjohn’s counsel so that Upjohn could obtain needed
advice from the lawyer. Second, higher-ranking actors within Upjohn
directed the employees to talk with Upjohn’s lawyer for the purpose of
legal advice for Upjohn. Third, the employees understood that they were
speaking with the Upjohn lawyer so that the corporation could obtain
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id. at 390.
See id. at 390–91.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 397 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501.).
See id. at 395.
Id.
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needed legal advice. Fourth, higher-ranking Upjohn employees did not
have the information that the lawyer needed. Fifth, the communicating
employees talked with Upjohn’s lawyer about matters that were within the
purview of the employees’ job responsibilities. Finally, the employees
were told that the communications and everything surrounding the
investigation was confidential and everyone heeded that instruction.108
Interestingly, the Court did not expressly discuss agency and its
requirements as a free-standing doctrine and never in its own analysis
stated that the representative of the client must be an agent. The Court
mentioned agency only twice. The Court once quoted the lower court’s
pronouncement that the entity’s “officers and agents” who were not
control group members could not be within the entity privilege109 and once
quoted the lower court’s pronouncement that the entity’s “officers and
agents” who were members of the control group could be within the
entity’s privilege.110 A rational interpretation of this lack of discussion of
agency is that the Upjohn opinion was designed to free the privilege
analysis from dependence on agency concepts unrelated to privilege goals
and to substitute a more nuanced functional analysis.
The Court opined that determinations regarding the reach of the entity
privilege—which employees can be representatives of the entity and
which of these employees’ communications with the entity’s lawyer are
protected—must, to be consistent with the words of Rule 501, be a
“‘recognition of a privilege based on a confidential relationship . . . on a
case-by-case basis.’”111 The Court acknowledged that such an approach
“may to some slight extent undermine desirable certainty in the boundaries
of the attorney-client privilege,” but noted that “it obeys the spirit of the
Rules.”112
Justice Burger concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.113 He
agreed that the control group approach was too narrow for determining the
reach of the entity privilege.114 Justice Burger argued, however, that the
majority should have set forth a general rule to guide the courts that would
apply to employees and former employees rather than simply discussing
factors to consider.115
108. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394–95 (1981).
109. Id. at 388.
110. Id. at 391.
111. Id. (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)).
112. Id. at 396–97.
113. See id. at 402 (Burger, J., concurring).
114. See id. (Burger, J., concurring) (“I agree fully with the Court’s rejection of the
so-called ‘control group’ test . . . .”).
115. See id. at 402–03 (Burger, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court should make clear now
that, as a general rule, a communication is privileged at least when, as here, an employee
or former employee speaks at the direction of the management with an attorney regarding
conduct or proposed conduct within the scope of employment.”).
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C. The Unresolved Issue: Former Employees and Other
Nonemployees
The Supreme Court’s Upjohn opinion clarified the analysis for
determining which employees can be representatives of the entity client
such that the entity’s privilege can protect communications involving
those employees and entity lawyer. The analysis must be a case-by case
factor analysis and must focus on underlying rationale for the privilege
while considering the factors discussed in the opinion and perhaps other
factors as well. The Supreme Court’s opinion left unresolved whether an
entity’s privilege can protect communications between the entity’s counsel
and nonemployees of all sorts, including the special case of former
employees—individuals who were employees when they gained the vital
information but who are former employees by the time they communicate
with the entity’s counsel.
The question of nonemployees was not before the Upjohn Court. The
situation involved communications with former employees in that seven
of the eighty-six employees interviewed by Upjohn’s counsel had ended
their employment relationship with Upjohn but did not involve
nonemployees who had never been employees.116 With regard to the
former employees, the Court refused to opine on the matter because the
lower courts had not addressed the issue.117 In the Court’s view, this was
a question to be dealt with on remand.118 Justice Burger was inclined to
include the former employees with the analysis the majority set out for
employees if a superior directed the former employees to speak with the
entity’s counsel.119
V.

FORMER EMPLOYEES
A. Many Courts Apply an Entity’s Privilege to Communications
Involving Former Employees

Many courts have applied an entity’s attorney-client privilege to
communications between the entity’s counsel and an individual who had
been an employee but, at the time of the communication, was no longer an
employee of the entity. Courts have done so when the former employee
was communicating with the entity’s attorney about information the

116. See id. at 394 n.3.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 397 n.6.
119. See id. at 402–03 (Burger, J., concurring) (“Because of the great importance of
the issue, in my view the Court should make clear now that, as a general rule, a
communication is privileged at least when, as here, an employee or former employee
speaks at the direction of the management with an attorney regarding conduct or proposed
conduct within the scope of employment.”).
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individual obtained during the employment.120 These courts have not
focused on a litmus test of employee status at the time of the
communication. Rather, the courts recognize the significance of the
relationship between the entity and the individual that resulted from the
fact that the individual had at one time been an employee and the fact that
the former employee has the information needed by counsel for the
corporation. Applying the corporation’s privilege to protect such
communications is consistent with the rationale of the privilege.
For example, in Peralta v. Cendant Corporation,121 Cendant was
sued for employment discrimination. The lawyer for Cendant
communicated with a former employee who had been the plaintiff’s
supervisor at Cendant.122 When the plaintiff’s lawyer later sought
information about those conversations, the court determined that
Cendant’s attorney-client privilege applied to protect Cendant’s lawyer’s
communications with the former employee that concerned “the former
employee’s conduct and knowledge, or communication with [the
organization’s] counsel, during his or her employment[.]”123
B. Some Courts Refuse to Apply an Entity’s Privilege to
Communications Involving Former Employees
A few courts have not been willing to apply the entity’s privilege to
communications between the entity’s counsel and former employees.124 In
120. See, e.g., In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 606 (4th Cir. 1997) (following Upjohn’s
analysis to apply the corporation’s privilege to former employee); United States v. Chen,
99 F.3d 1495, 1502 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying the corporation’s privilege to former
employees); Export-Import Bank of the United States v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., 232 F.R.D.
103, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Virtually all courts hold that communications between
company counsel and former company employees are privileged if they concern
information obtained during the course of employment.”); Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 190
F.R.D. 38, 41 (D. Conn. 1999) (applying the corporation’s privilege to former employee);
see also Richmond, supra note 17, at 54–55; RICE, supra note 17, at § 4:18 (discussing
former employees).
121. 190 F.R.D. 38 (D. Conn. 1999).
122. See id. at 39.
123. Id. at 41. For a court following the Peralta approach, see Jacobs v. Alam, No.
15-10516, 2020 WL 3064435, *6–7 (E.D. Mich. June 9, 2020) (reasoning that an entity’s
privilege protects communications between the entity’s lawyer and a former employee of
entity).
124. See, e.g., Newman v. Highland School Dist. No. 203, 381 P.3d 1188, 1194
(Wash. 2016) (en banc) (rejecting privilege application to former employees); Infosystems,
Inc. v. Ceridian Corp., 197 F.R.D. 303, 306 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (rejecting application of
privilege generally but noting that there could be a rare circumstance in which the
corporation’s attorney-client privilege should apply). In Infosystems, the court noted that
the corporation’s privilege generally should not reach communications between the
corporation’s counsel and former employees. Yet, the Infosystems court stated that:
there may be situations where the former employee retains a present connection
or agency relationship with the client corporation, or where the present-day
communication concerns a confidential matter that was uniquely within the
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Newman v. Highland School District No. 203,125 the Washington Supreme
Court refused to apply the entity school district’s attorney-client privilege
to communications between the entity’s counsel and former employees
even when the former employees talked with the attorney to provide the
attorney with the information the attorney needed for the attorney to
represent the school board.
In Newman, a high school quarterback, having suffered a permanent
brain injury, sued the school district claiming that coaches allowed him to
play even though he exhibited concussion symptoms.126 The lawyer for the
school district interviewed the coaches employed by the school district at
the time of the incident, some of whom were no longer employees of the
school district at the time of the communications.127 When the plaintiff’s
attorney sought access to those communications, the school district
claimed that the entity’s privilege protected those communications.128 The
Newman court “decline[d] to expand the privilege to communications
outside the employer-employee relationship because former employees
categorically differ from current employees with respect to the concerns
identified in Upjohn and Youngs.”129 The Newman court required
employee status at the time of the communication because the “flexible
approach articulated in Upjohn presupposed attorney-client
communications taking place within the corporate employment
relationship.”130 As noted by the Newman dissent,131 this statement by the
Newman majority is suspect given that the Upjohn court specifically noted

knowledge of the former employee when he worked for the client corporation,
such that counsel’s communications with this former employee must be cloaked
with the privilege in order for meaningful fact-gathering to occur.
Id. at 305–06.
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, in Section 73, comment e, notes
that generally the entity’s privilege does not apply to communications involving former
employees because they are no longer agents of the organization at the time of the
communication but that such communications may be privileged if the contract between
the individual and the entity provides that the individual must give information to the
corporation’s lawyer even after the end of the employment. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2000).
125. 381 P.3d 1188 (Wash. 2016) (en banc).
126. See id. at 1189–90.
127. See id. at 1190.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 1192 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Youngs v.
PeaceHealth, 316 P.3d 1035 (Wash. 2014)).
130. Id.
131. The dissent takes issue with the idea that the Upjohn opinion presupposes
employee status, noting that the Upjohn court specifically refused to decide whether the
privilege applied to former employees. See Newman, 381 P.3d at 1196.
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that it was not deciding the question of privilege coverage regarding
former employees.132
In the Newman court’s view, because there is no “ongoing obligation
between the former employee and employer that gives rise to a principalagent relationship, a former employee is no different from other third-party
fact witnesses to a lawsuit . . . .”133 Acknowledging that former employees
may have information important to the entity’s attorney in representing the
entity, and acknowledging that former employees’ conduct while
employed could have created situations for which the entity can be liable,
the court stated that these concerns “do not justify expanding the attorneyclient privilege beyond its purpose.”134 The Newman court then defined
the privilege’s purpose as “foster[ing] full and frank communications
between counsel and the client (i.e., the corporation), not its former
employees.”135 In the Newman court’s view, the entity’s privilege could
reach and cover communications between the entity’s attorney and
“constituents and agents,”136 but not, generally, former employees,
because former employees are not employees at the time of the
communication and thus are not agents of the entity at the time of the
communication—and presumably not constituents. In so holding, the
Newman court stated that it “preserve[d] a predictable legal
framework.”137
VI. NONEMPLOYEES AND AGENCY AND THE RESTATEMENTS
When the question of the reach of the entity privilege relates to
communications involving the entity’s lawyer and a nonemployee who is
involved with the entity but who has never been an entity employee, the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers takes the position that,
generally, only agents of the entity corporation can be representatives of a
corporate client for the purpose of the corporation’s attorney-client
privilege.138 The Restatement measures that agency at the time of the
communication with the entity’s lawyer.139 Comment e to section 73 of the
Restatement states, in part:

132. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394; see also supra Part IV.C (discussing the fact that
the Upjohn majority expressly did not decide privilege application regarding former
employees).
133. Newman, 381 P.3d at 1193.
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing State v. Chervenell, 662 P.2d 836 (Wash. 1983)).
136. Id. at 1192.
137. Id. at 1193.
138. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. d (AM.
L. INST. 2000) (stating that a communication must be between a privileged person and “an
agent of the organization”).
139. See id. at § 73 cmt. e.
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[A] person making a privileged communication to a lawyer for an
organization must then be acting as agent of the principal-organization.
The objective of the organizational privilege is to encourage the
organization to have its agents communicate with its lawyer . . .
Generally, that premise implies that persons be agents of the
organization at the time of communicating. The privilege may also
extend, however, to communications with a person with whom the
organization has terminated, for most other purposes, an agency
relationship. A former agent is a privileged person under Subsection
(2) if, at the time of communicating, the former agent has a continuing
legal obligation to the principal-organization to furnish the information
to the organization’s lawyer. The scope of such a continuing obligation
is determined by the law of agency and the terms of the employment
contract . . . .140

Thus, the entity’s privilege generally does not apply to
communications involving former employees because they are no longer
agents of the organization at the time of the communication. Such
communications may be privileged if the contract between the individual
and the entity provides that the individual must give information to the
entity’s lawyer even after the end of the employment. Referencing
traditional agency principles, the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers explains that officers and employees are agents for
various purposes, that directors may be agents if they are communicating
in the interest of and for the benefit of the corporation, and that
independent contractors can be agents as well.141
But what, exactly, is an agency relationship? How does one
determine who is an agent of a principal and for which purposes? The
Restatement (Third) of Agency defines “agency” as follows:
Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a
“Principal”) manifests assent to another Person (an “Agent”) that the
Agent shall act on the Principal’s behalf and subject to the Principal’s
control, and the Agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to
act.142

The “control” concept, explains the Restatement (Third) of Agency,
encompasses situations that do not involve physical control. Control exists
if the principal has the right to give the putative agent direction, to assess
the putative agent’s performance, and to terminate the relationship with
the putative agent.143 The Restatement (Third) of Agency provides more
background for understanding:
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
See id. at § 73 cmt. d.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006).
See id. at § 1.01 cmt. f.
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The term “agency” has several distinct meanings. The common law
definition of a relationship of agency uses concepts, such as
“manifestation” and “control,” that embrace a wide spectrum of
meanings and that in this application are highly fact-specific. As a
result, agency law covers a broader set of relationships than might be
expected. Manifestations may be made indirectly and in generalized
ways, and legal implications do not necessarily depend on precise
statements made to specifically identified individuals. Likewise, a
principal’s right of control, which entitles the principal to give interim
instructions or directions to the agent, is a broadly drawn concept.144

Regarding the control aspect, the Restatement (Third) of Agency
states:
Control is a concept that embraces a wide spectrum of meanings, but
within any relationship of agency the principal initially states what the
agent shall and shall not do, in specific or general terms. Additionally,
a principal has the right to give interim instructions or directions to the
agent once their relationship is established. Within an organization the
right to control its agents is essential to the organization’s ability to
function, regardless of its size, structure, or degree of hierarchy or
complexity . . . . A principal may exercise influence over an agent’s
actions in other ways as well. Incentive structures that reward the agent
for achieving results affect the agent’s actions. In an organization,
assigning a specified function with a functionally descriptive title to a
person tends to control activity because it manifests what types of
activity are approved by the principal to all who know of the function
and title, including their holder.145

Thus, in very many situations involving nonemployees who have
vital information about the entity and who have sustained working
relationships with the entity—members of the corporate team, insiders,
nonemployees whose role is such that a court would recognize a
significant relationship between the nonemployee and the entity—those
individuals are also agents of the entity for certain purposes.
For example, assume Alpha Corporation has contracted with Staffing
Corporation so that Staffing Corp. supplies Alpha with four information
technology specialists who are Staffing employees. The contract term is
two years. The contract has been renewed several times. Specialist Bonnie
has worked on Alpha matters in Alpha’s corporate headquarters for years.
After a cybersecurity incident, Alpha’s attorney communicated with
Bonnie for the sole purpose of gaining information that only Bonnie had
about the incident. Nonemployee Bonnie is likely an agent of Alpha, the
entity, for some purposes. Bonnie can thus be a representative of the
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY intro. note (AM. L. INST. 2006).
145. Id. at § 1.01 cmt. f.
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corporate client for purposes of the privilege even under the Restatement
requirement that the representative be an agent of the entity. In fact, courts
generally have not gone so far as to rigorously address the agency issue.
VII. THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT ANALYSIS AS APPLIED
In situations involving nonemployees, some courts do not address the
agency issue but rather discuss whether they should adopt the “functional
equivalent test” to determine whether nonemployees can be protected by
an entity’s privilege.146 Some courts have refused to use a functional
equivalent analysis, viewing such a move as an expansion of Upjohn.147 If
these courts are deciding that nonemployees categorically cannot be
representatives of the entity client for purposes of the entity’s privilege,
then these courts are contradicting the historically generally accepted
principle that a nonemployee can be an agent of an entity principle and
thus a representative of the client for purposes of the privilege.
Some courts have been willing to consider the idea that a
nonemployee can be a representative of the entity client for purposes of
the privilege and have applied the functional equivalent concept to identify
nonemployees whose communications with entity counsel can be
protected by the entity’s privilege.148 Unfortunately, many of these courts
have formulated functional equivalence analyses that focus on whether the
nonemployee is the functional equivalent of an employee without regard
to the effect the court’s definition has on the purposes of the privilege.149
146. See, e.g., Glob. Textile All., Inc. v. TDI Worldwide, LLC, 847 S.E.2d 30, 35
(N.C. 2020). The Global Textile court did not define agency or apply agency concepts
expressly but concluded that there was no agency relationship:
Yet, even if these specialized attorney-client privilege applications were
recognized under North Carolina law, the Business Court did not abuse its
discretion by determining that these specialized applications do not apply in this
case. Under the functional-equivalent test, an individual is the functional
equivalent of a company’s employee when his communications with counsel
“fell within the scope of his duties” for the company. In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d at
940. This specialized application does not apply because Haspeslagh lacks any
sort of agency relationship with GTA and thus cannot have “duties” at GTA.
Id. at 35.
147. See, e.g., In re Dealer Mgmt. Sys. Antitrust Litig., 335 F.R.D. 510, 518 (N.D.
Ill. 2020) (declining to adopt the “functional equivalent test” and stating that even if it
adopted the analysis the nonemployee was not a functional equivalent).
148. See United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2010); In re Bieter Co.,
16 F.3d 929, 938 (8th Cir. 1994); see, e.g., Berisha v. Lawson, 973 F.3d 1304, 1318 (11th
Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2424 (2021) (mem.) (holding that a nonemployee’s
communications with the corporation’s attorney are protected by the corporation’s
attorney-client privilege).
149. See, e.g., Frank v. Morgans Hotel Grp. Mgmt. LLC, 116 N.Y.S.3d 889, 892
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020) (“[W]hether a consultant or other contractor has in practice
‘assum[ed] the functions and duties of [a] full-time employee’ and has been ‘so thoroughly
integrated’ into the corporation’s structure that he or she ‘is a de facto employee of the

2022]

THE ENTITY ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

497

The focus of these courts is whether the nonemployee is the functional
equivalent of an employee, not whether the nonemployee’s relationship
with the entity is of the same significance of involvement as an employee.
In addition, some courts, in determining nonemployees who are functional
equivalents, apply narrow requirements so that the test is not determining
a functional equivalent of an employee, but rather a small set of
employees.150
The result of some of these approaches is that privilege protection
does not apply to a nonemployee who has all the characteristics that would
allow an employee’s communications with the entity lawyer to be
privileged. Such a nonemployee might be embedded in a company for
years, might work as a member of the entity team, might be responsible
for tasks directed by the entity, and might have important information the
entity’s counsel needs to advise the entity. Yet, no privilege applies
because that nonemployee is not the functional equivalent of an employee
or a particular type of employee. A rigorous agency analysis, however,
likely would determine that such a nonemployee is an agent of the
corporation for purposes of the entity privilege. In the era of the Upjohn
opinion, an entity employee may have had that role. Under the teachings
of Upjohn, the communications between entity’s counsel and that
employee would have been protected by the entity’s privilege. Yet, some
courts of today would deny that such a nonemployee can be a
representative of the client—that the entity’s privilege could protect
communications involving the entity’s counsel and that nonemployee.
A. The Origin of the Functional Equivalent Analysis: In re Bieter
Company
The birth of the functional equivalent doctrine vis-à-vis
nonemployees traces to In re Bieter Company,151 a case decided in 1994
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. In Bieter, an
individual who was not an employee of the company was intimately
involved in the real estate development project that was the reason for the
company.’” (quoting Export-Import Bank of the United States v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co.,
232 F.R.D. 103, 113 S.D.N.Y. 2005)); People v. McQueen, No. 451825/2019, 2020 WL
1878107, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 21, 2020) (“[T]he third-party must assume the functions
and duties of a full-time employee.”); see also infra Part VII.B (discussing this approach).
150. See, e.g., Export-Import Bank of the United States v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co.,
232 F.R.D. 103, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (referring to a “key corporate job”); see infra Part
VII.B (discussing the Export-Import Bank approach).
151. 16 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 1994). As noted in the Bieter opinion, McCaugherty v.
Sifferman, 123 F.R.D. 234, 239 (N.D. Cal. 1990), preceded Bieter and found that several
consultants were “functional equivalents of employees.” Bieter, 16 F.3d at 929. Yet, later
courts look to Bieter, not McCaugherty, as the influential opinion regarding the doctrine.
See, e.g., Berisha, 973 F.3d at 1318 (referring to the Bieter opinion, the court stated that
other courts have been “[l]ed by the Eighth Circuit”).
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company’s existence. When litigation related to the project occurred, the
nonemployee was intimately involved in the litigation as well. No contract
defined the terms of the nonemployee’s involvement for a part of the
relevant time, but a contract that covered a year of the time stated that the
nonemployee was not an “agent, employee, or partner” of the company.152
In evaluating whether the company’s attorney-client privilege
protected communications between the nonemployee and the company’s
lawyers, the court noted that the circuit had adopted a type of subject
matter test to determine whether an employee’s communications with the
employer’s lawyer would be covered by the entity’s privilege.153
According to that test, the entity’s privilege applied to an employee’s
communications with counsel for the entity if:
(1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal
advice; (2) the employee making the communication did so at the
direction of his corporate superior; (3) the superior made the request
so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) the subject matter
of the communication is within the scope of the employee’s corporate
duties; and (5) the communication is not disseminated beyond those
persons who, because of the corporate structure, need to know its
contents.154

In shifting to the situation of a nonemployee, the Bieter court
identified two issues. First, was the nonemployee a representative of the
company because he had a relationship with the company “of the sort that
justifies application of the privilege[?]”155 Second, are the elements of the
test for employees satisfied?156 In effect, if the nonemployee had a
relationship sufficient to be a representative of the client, then the court
should treat the nonemployee as it would treat an employee of the
company. The Bieter court stated that “‘at times there will be potential
information-givers who are not employees of the corporation but who are
nonetheless meaningfully associated with the corporation in a way that
makes it appropriate to consider them “insiders” for purposes of the
privilege.’”157

152. See Bieter, 16 F.3d at 933–34.
153. See id. at 936.
154. Id. (quoting Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir.
1977)).
155. Id. at 938.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 936 (quoting Sexton, supra note 1, at 498). The Bieter court also relied on
McCaugherty in which the court applied an entity’s privilege to communications between
the entity’s lawyers and two “independent consultants.” See id.; see also McCaugherty,
132 F.R.D. at 239.
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The Bieter court concluded that the nonemployee, referred to by the
court as an “independent consultant,”158 was “in all relevant respects the
functional equivalent of an employee.”159 The court reasoned that the
nonemployee was involved on a daily basis with the company and had
worked on the company’s behalf on the project that led to the litigation,
often dealing with third parties as the representative of the company. The
nonemployee likely had information about the subject of the litigation and
the company that no one else possessed.160
The Bieter court did not expressly declare that the nonemployee was
an agent of the company for privilege purposes. In addition, the court
never stated that it agreed with the proclamation in the contract involving
the entity and the nonemployee that the nonemployee was not an agent of
the company when privilege was the issue. Rather, without wading into
agency analysis, the court declared that the nonemployee’s relationship
with the company was “of the sort that justifies application of the
privilege,” and the court should thus recognize the nonemployee as a
representative of the entity client for purposes of the privilege.161 The
Bieter court concluded that the test for an employee being a representative
of the entity was satisfied as well.162 Just as the Upjohn opinion set out no
list of required elements for employees to be representatives of the entity
for purposes of the privilege, so too the Bieter court did not state particular
facts that must be present for the nonemployee to be a functional
equivalent of an employee.
B. Flawed Functional Equivalent Analysis
Since Bieter, other courts have struggled, while citing Bieter and
claiming to follow its lead, in deciding which nonemployees can be
representatives of an entity for purposes of the entity’s attorney-client
privilege. These courts have created a variety of requirements far afield
from Bieter’s relatively liquid functional relationship analysis that was
tied to the goals of the privilege.
For example, some courts apply an analysis that requires the
nonemployee to have duties and roles identical to that of the court’s view
of a “de facto employee” or a “full-time employee.”163 Upjohn does not
158. Bieter, 16 F.3d at 936.
159. Id. at 938.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 938–39.
163. In People v. McQueen, the court stated: “For the functional equivalent exception
to apply, the third-party must assume the functions and duties of a full-time employee.”
People v. McQueen, 451825/2019, 2020 WL 1878107, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 21, 2020).
In Frank v. Morgans Hotel Grp. Mgmt. LLC, the court stated: “The overall inquiry, these
decisions suggest, is whether a consultant or other contractor has in practice ‘assum[ed]
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require an employee to be a “full-time employee” in order to be a
representative of an entity client. Yet, the nonemployee analysis of some
courts has used this concept.
Other courts have looked at factors such as whether the nonemployee
“exercised independent decision-making on the company’s behalf”;
whether the nonemployee “served as a company representative to third
parties”; whether the nonemployee “maintained an office at the company
or otherwise spent a substantial amount of time working for it”; and
whether the nonemployee “sought legal advice from corporate counsel to
guide his or her work for the company.”164 In In re Restasis (Cyclosporine
Ophthalmic Emulsion) Antitrust Litigation,165 the court listed these factors
that it gleaned from other opinions and applied them to nonemployee
consultants. One of the consultants was an expert on Federal Drug
Administration (FDA) processes and was engaged to assist with dealing
with the FDA.166 The second consultant was an expert in governmental
affairs and was engaged to assist with dealing with the FDA and
Congress.167 The court concluded that the consultants in question were not
“de facto employees.”168 They did not make decisions themselves, they
did not appear with third parties as the company’s representatives, they
worked out of their own offices that were not located at the company, they
used email addresses that did not belong to the entity, and “likely served
as consultants for other companies while they were assisting” the
company.169 They also were not “so integrated into its corporate structure
that [they] sought and received legal advice from [the entity]’s counsel,
rather than solely providing [their] input to [the entity]’s counsel and
staff.”170
In the Restasis court’s view, the nonemployees must be “like” the
court’s view of an employee rather than, in the court’s words, “typical
part-time consultants.”171 The nonemployees also must be “like” a very
special type of employee who seeks advice from the entity’s counsel,

the functions and duties of [a] full-time employee’ and has been ‘so thoroughly integrated’
into the corporation’s structure that he or she ‘is a de facto employee of the company.’”
Frank v. Morgans Hotel Grp. Mgmt. LLC, 116 N.Y.S.3d 889, 892 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)
(quoting Export-Import Bank of the United States v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., 232 F.R.D.
103, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
164. In re Restasis (Cyclosporine Ophthalmic Emulsion) Antitrust Litig., 352 F.
Supp. 3d 207, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (applying functional equivalence to find no privilege
protection, the court was “skeptical” that the Second Circuit would “adopt the exception”).
165. 352 F. Supp. 3d 207 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
166. See id. at 209.
167. See id. at 210.
168. Id. at 215.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 214.
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makes decisions for the company, and such. These requirements require
the nonemployee to be very similar to a control group employee. Yet, at
least for purposes of federal law, Upjohn long ago rejected the idea that an
employee must be a member of the control group to be a representative of
the entity for purposes of the entity’s attorney-client privilege. Such
requirements for nonemployees do nothing to further the goals of the
privilege and can frustrate those goals, whether the individual is an
employee or nonemployee.
Another influential case that applied the functional equivalent
analysis very narrowly, adding requirements beyond those required for
employees that do nothing to further the goals of the privilege, is ExportImport Bank of the United States v. Asia Pulp & Paper Company.172 In
Export-Import Bank, the court addressed the question of whether a
corporation’s privilege applied to communications involving the
corporation’s attorney and a consultant or the consultant’s employees. The
corporation had engaged the consultant and thus the consultant’s
employees to assist the corporation with debt restructuring.173 The ExportImport Bank court stated:
To determine whether a consultant should be considered the functional
equivalent of an employee, courts look to whether the consultant had
primary responsibility for a key corporate job, . . . whether there was a
continuous and close working relationship between the consultant and
the company’s principals on matters critical to the company’s position
in litigation, . . . and whether the consultant is likely to possess
information possessed by no one else at the company.174

For each of these elements stated by the Export-Import Bank court,
the court cited In re Bieter as the source for the requirement.175 Note,
however, that in Bieter the nonemployee had an important corporate job,
but the Bieter court did not require such. In other words, what in Bieter
was a characteristic of the situation before the court relevant in the court’s
analysis, became, perhaps, a requirement for the Export-Import Bank
court. In evaluating the situation before it, the Export-Import Bank court
172. 232 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). An example of the influence of this case is In
re Dealer Mgmt. Sys. Antitrust Litig., 335 F.R.D. 510 (N.D. Ill. 2020). The court in Dealer
Management refused to apply the functional equivalent concept but then concluded that if
it did apply the doctrine, the nonemployee would not pass the test for functional
equivalence. The court then stated a test taken from LG Elec. U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool
Corp., 661 F. Supp. 2d 958, 963 (N.D. Ill. 2009), which, in turn, is based on the test stated
in Export-Import Bank of the United States v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., 232 F.R.D. 103
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). See In re Dealer, 335 F.R.D. at 518; see also Anderson v. Seaworld Parks
& Ent., Inc., 329 F.R.D. 628, 634 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (listing Export-Import Bank factors).
173. See Export-Import Bank, 232 F.R.D. at 107.
174. Id. at 113 (citations omitted).
175. See id.
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noted that the entity had “the burden of showing that [the nonemployee]
and his associates meet this standard of integration into the [entity’s]
corporate structure” and failed to do so.176 Though the entity provided the
consultant an office at the company, he rarely used it.177 In addition, the
court noted that though the consultant testified that he spent eighty-five
percent of his time on the entity’s matter, he had enough time to start
another business.178 Though the entity “demonstrated [the nonemployee]
was intimately involved in [the entity]’s restructuring talks,” the court
stated that his “efforts are precisely those that any financial consultant
would likely make under the circumstances.”179 The court concluded:
[The consultant]’s schedule, the location of his head offices, and the
success of his consulting business all contradict the picture of [the
consultant] as so fully integrated into the [entity] hierarchy as to be a
de facto employee of [the entity]. Possibly [the consultant] was able to
do both—run his company and function as an [entity] employee—but
it was [the entity]’s job to prove that he did, and [the entity] has failed
to do so.180

What began in Upjohn and was expanded in Bieter was a functional
analysis to determine who, employee of the entity or not, agent of the
entity or not, had a relationship with the entity significant enough to be
thought of as a representative of the entity for purposes of the privilege.
Who is a true entity insider, a true member of the team? Following Upjohn,
such an individual must also have information needed by the entity’s
lawyer to render legal advice to that entity. In the Export-Import Bank
case, the Restasis case, and other cases with similar reasoning, the process
of identifying a nonemployee who can be a representative of the entity
client has devolved into a matching test as a proxy for a relationship test.
Does this nonemployee have the characteristics of an employee—does the
nonemployee “look like” an employee? This match game analysis then
leads to consideration of characteristics of an employee that are irrelevant
to the nature of the relationship between the nonemployee and the entity,
the nonemployee and the matter, and the nonemployee and the needed
information. In addition, this approach is rife with characteristics that are
hardly characteristics of employees of the twenty-first century, especially
in post-pandemic times. If an employee has a separate business on the side,
does that make the employee less of an employee? It apparently made the
consultant in Export-Import Bank look less like an employee.

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
See id.
See id. at 113–14.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 114.
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Finally, these courts have added factors to consider in this analysis
that, if applied to employees, would bar many employees that might have
information about the entity client that the entity lawyer needs from being
representatives of the client for purposes of the privilege. Such a result is
clearly contrary to the teachings of Upjohn and the rationale underlying
the entity attorney-client privilege. For example, the Export-Import Bank
court listed as a factor “whether the consultant had primary responsibility
for a key corporate job.”181 Yet, in Upjohn the Supreme Court accepted
the notion that employees who have information necessary for the entity’s
attorney to render legal advice to the entity can be representatives of the
entity for purposes of the privilege regardless of the status of those
individuals if they learned that information in the scope of the
employment. To require that the nonemployee have “primary
responsibility for a key corporate job” resurrects the control group
requirement that the Upjohn Court specifically rejected, at least for
purposes of federal law.182 Indeed, such a test would exclude
nonemployees who are clearly agents of the entity for certain purposes
under principal and agency principles.183
C. The Relationship of the Functional Equivalent Analysis with
Agency Status of Nonemployees
An additional theoretical confusion in the midst of courts’ attempts
to deal with a functional equivalent analysis is the analysis’s relationship
with agency principles. Assuming nonemployees have information an
entity’s lawyer needs to properly represent the entity, have courts used the
functional equivalent analysis as a method of identifying nonemployees
who are agents of the entity such that they can be representatives of the
entity client for purposes of the privilege? In other words, are courts using
the functional equivalent analysis as a means of determining
nonemployees who qualify as agents so that their communications with
the entity’s lawyer are protected by the corporation’s privilege? Such an
analysis would omit agents that are not “like” employees. Or rather, have
courts used the functional equivalent analysis a method of identifying
nonemployees who can be representatives of the corporate client for
purposes of the privilege regardless of agency status?
Courts have not been clear. They generally have not analyzed agency
when they have discussed functional equivalence.184 At most, a court
181. Export-Import Bank, 232 F.R.D. at 113.
182. See supra Part IV.B (discussing Upjohn).
183. See supra Part VI (discussing agency).
184. See generally Frank v. Morgans Hotel Grp. Mgmt., LLC, 116 N.Y.S. 3d 889
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020) (including no mention of agency); Narayanan v. Sutherland Glob.
Holdings Inc., 285 F.Supp.3d 604 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (including no agency discussion).
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identifies the nonemployee as an agent (or not) with no analysis of the
status based in agency law.185
The Washington Supreme Court varied from the norm in Hermanson
v. MultiCare Health System, Inc.186 The Hermanson Court applied both
agency analysis and, independently, a functional equivalent analysis. The
Court held that an independent contractor was both an agent and the
functional equivalent of an entity employee.187
In Hermanson, the Court faced the question of whether a lawyer
representing MultiCare, an entity that owned a hospital, could
communicate ex parte with the plaintiff’s treating physician.188 The
plaintiff had been treated at the hospital by various people, including a
physician who was not an employee of MultiCare. The doctor was an
employee of another entity and was an independent contractor vis-à-vis
MultiCare.189 If the hospital entity’s privilege protected the
communications between MultiCare’s lawyer and the physician, then the
entity’s privilege, in effect, trumped Washington’s rule that banned
opposing counsel from talking ex parte with the plaintiff’s treating
physician. Thus, the Washington Supreme Court reached the question of
the scope of MultiCare’s privilege on the way to a holding about ex parte
communications.190 There was no doubt that the physician had information
pertinent to the litigation given that he was the plaintiff’s treating
physician.191
The physician in Hermanson was an employee of another entity,
Trauma Trust.192 Trauma Trust had been created, in part, by MultiCare.193
Trauma Trust contracted to provide the physician to MultiCare.194 The
agreement between the entities provided: “[E]ach party is an independent
contractor with respect to the others. Except as expressly provided in this
185. See, e.g., Glob. Textile All., Inc. v. TDI Worldwide, LLC, 847 S.E.2d 30, 35
(N.C. 2020) (concluding that a nonemployee had no duties so was not an agent; functional
equivalent analysis does not apply); U.S. ex rel. Wollman v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., Inc., 475
F. Supp. 3d 45, 68 (Mass. 2020) (determining the functional equivalent doctrine “‘provides
that certain third-party agents of corporate entities, such as consultants, can be considered
the “functional equivalent” of corporate employees’”) (quoting Lynx Sys. Developers, Inc.
v. Zebra Enter. Sols. Corp., Civil Action No. 15-12297-GAO, 2018 WL 1532614, at *2
(D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2018)).
186. 475 P.3d 484 (Wash. 2020).
187. See id. at 486 (concluding that the independent contractor “maintains a
principal-agent relationship with [the entity] and serves as the ‘functional equivalent’ of a
MultiCare employee”).
188. See id.
189. See id. at 489.
190. See id. at 488–89.
191. See id. at 489 (explaining that the physician was the doctor who treated the
plaintiff during the plaintiff’s stay at the MultiCare hospital).
192. See id. at 486.
193. See id.
194. See id.

2022]

THE ENTITY ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

505

agreement, no party is authorized or permitted to act or to claim to be
acting as an agent or employee of any other party.”195
The Hermanson Court first focused on the agency status of the
physician, not on functional equivalence. Applying a fluid agency
analysis, the court determined that the independent contractor physician
was an agent of the hospital entity, MultiCare, despite the fact that the
physician was not an employee of MultiCare.196 In so doing, the court
distinguished the situation of former employees who were no longer
agents of the entity.197 The court noted that the physician had an office at
the hospital and was expected, as a result of the contract between
MultiCare and Trauma Trust, to follow MultiCare policies and
procedures.198 The Hermanson Court stated that the key element to an
agency relationship is the principal’s control of the details of the agent’s
work.199 Because MultiCare was a founder of Trauma Trust, the physician
had an office at the hospital, and the physician was expected to follow
MultiCare policy and procedure, the court concluded that the physician
“‘owes duties of loyalty, obedience, and confidentiality’” to MultiCare
even as an independent contractor and “maintains a principal-agent
relationship with” MultiCare, the hospital entity.200 Thus, the court, basing
its decision on the reality of the situation and ignoring any contrary
contract language denying agency, recognized the physician, and
independent contractor, as the agent of the entity principal.201
The Hermanson Court then also determined that the physician was a
“‘functional equivalent’ of MultiCare’s employee.”202 The Hermanson
Court stated a conceptual version of the functional equivalent analysis as
described in In re Bieter,203 not focusing on the intricate details of the
Bieter fact situation as the Export-Import Bank court had done.204 Rather,
the Hermanson Court followed the more-generalized teaching of the
Bieter court: the privilege applied to “nonemployees ‘who possess a
“significant relationship to the [client] and the [client]’s involvement in
195. Hermanson, 475 P.3d at 494 (Stephens, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (emphasis in original).
196. See id. at 489 (“[The physician] still maintains a principal-agent relationship
with MultiCare . . . .”).
197. See id. (distinguishing the holding in Newman which refused to apply entity’s
attorney-client privilege to communications between entity lawyer and former employees
even when employees were the source of vital information needed for lawyer to advise
entity client). See supra Part V.B (discussing Newman).
198. See id. at 489–90.
199. See id. at 489 (citing Wilcox v. Basehore, 387 P.3d 531 (Wash. 2017)).
200. Id. (quoting Newman v. Highland Sch. Dist. No. 203, 381 P.3d 1188, 1192
(Wash. 2016)).
201. See id.
202. Id.
203. 16 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 1994).
204. See Hermanson, 475 P.3d at 489–90; see also discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
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the transaction that is the subject of legal services.”‘”205 The Hermanson
Court then found that the physician-nonemployee “maintains a ‘significant
relationship’ to MultiCare,” acting as a trauma surgeon in the hospital with
an office there, and, in accord with the agreement between MultiCare and
Trauma Trust, the employer of the physician, “reports his work” to the
hospital.206 In addition, the physician treats patients at the hospital “under
the purview” of MultiCare and works “on behalf of both MultiCare and
Trauma Trust.”207 The Hermanson Court concluded: “Unlike most
independent contractors who are hired on a project-by-project basis, [the
physician] constantly performs work in a MultiCare facility that is
consistently monitored by MultiCare, thus making him the ‘functional
equivalent’ of a MultiCare employee.”208 Thus, the Hermanson Court held
that MultiCare’s attorney-client privilege protected MultiCare’s counsel’s
conversations with the independent contractor physician and MultiCare’s
lawyer thus could have ex parte conversations with that doctor even
though he was also the plaintiff’s treating physician.209
Interestingly, the Hermanson Court never clearly stated the
relationship between agent status and functional equivalence. While the
Court found the physician to be both an agent and the functional equivalent
of an entity employee, it is not clear whether the Court considered both
conclusions to be necessary. Given the Washington Supreme Court’s
earlier Newman opinion that refused to apply the entity’s privilege to
former employees because they were no longer agents,210 a logical
conclusion is that the Hermanson Court required the physician to be
MultiCare’s agent. But then what is the place of the functional equivalent
analysis?
VIII.

AN IMPROVED FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT ANALYSIS

Is there a functional equivalent approach that is closely aligned with
Upjohn’s view of the rationale of the privilege and also eases courts’
burden of determining the scope of entity privilege in light of the vast array
of nonemployees used in the economic enterprise in which entities are
205. Hermanson, 475 P.3d at 490 (quoting In re Bieter, 16 F.3d at 938 (quoting
Sexton, supra note 1, at 487)). The court also noted that the Ninth Circuit had approved of
the functional equivalent approach in United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2010).
206. Hermanson, 475 P.3d at 490.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 490. One might debate the court’s assumption that independent contractors
are usually hired on a project basis. This is yet another example of a court’s idiosyncratic
view of what is an employee that may, or may not, be based in fact.
209. See id. The court further noted that its holding was not dependent on whether
MultiCare, the entity, was vicariously liable for the physician’s conduct.
210. See Newman v. Highland School Dist. No. 203, 381 P.3d 1188, 1193 (Wash.
2016) (en banc); see also supra Part V.B (discussing the Washington Supreme Court’s
Newman opinion).
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involved? First, courts must return to the teachings of Upjohn. The
Supreme Court in Upjohn held that Upjohn’s attorney-client privilege
could apply to employees if those individuals had vital information needed
by the entity’s counsel to represent the entity and if a court determined
that there should be a “‘[r]ecognition of a privilege based on a confidential
relationship . . . on a case-by-case basis.’”211 The Upjohn Court listed
factors to consider but did not state a rule.212 The rationale of this approach
was that this method of analysis best accomplishes the stated goals—that
the entity lawyer can best advise the entity client and, ultimately, society
writ large can benefit.213
With this guiding light in mind, courts, when considering whether
nonemployees are representatives of an entity client for purposes of the
privilege, must evaluate whether recognizing the nonemployee as a
representative of the entity furthers the purposes of the privilege. If the
nonemployee has information needed by the entity’s lawyer, the focus
must be on whether the nonemployee has a significant relationship with
the entity such that the court should recognize the nonemployee as a
representative of the entity for purposes of the privilege.
The functional equivalent analysis should consider the significance
of the relationship between the entity and the nonemployee. The
functional equivalent analysis should not be an analysis focused on
whether the nonemployee has traits the court identifies as employee traits.
Those traits vary widely in the economy of the twenty-first century and
are certainly not what some courts believe them to be.214 Even as a matter
of employment law, the concept of an employee is shifting.215
In addition, some courts in the past have required traits that are far
beyond traits of employees, narrowing the application of the privilege to
nonemployees that are similar to control group employees.216 This is a far

211. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981) (quoting Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)).
212. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394–95; see also supra Part IV.B (discussing the
Upjohn opinion).
213. See id. at 389.
214. For example, the court in Export-Import Bank of the United States v. Asia Pulp
& Paper Co. focused on where the consultant did the work, noting that though he had an
office at the entity, he rarely used that office and physically worked elsewhere. See ExportImport Bank of the U.S. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., 232 F.R.D. 103, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Now, remote work abounds for employees and nonemployees alike.
215. See Chichester & Behnia, supra note 41 (discussing changes in the definition of
“employee” in California); see also Jaffe, supra note 43 (discussing the changing
classification of workers for purposes of employment law).
216. See supra Part VII.B. See, e.g., People v. McQueen, 451825/2019, 2020 WL
1878107 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 21, 2020) (discussing the functions of a “full-time
employee”); Export-Import Bank of the U.S, v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., 232 F.R.D. 103,
113 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing a “key corporate job”).
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cry from Upjohn’s rejection of a control group test for employees and
inconsistent with Upjohn’s statement of the privilege’s rationale.
Courts can approach the question of whether a nonemployee can be
a representative of a client without focusing on principal and agent
relationships. The law of principal and agent may be difficult for courts to
translate to the context of entities and nonemployees and the attorneyclient privilege. A court may determine that a nonemployee has the
required information and has a significant relationship with the entity and
matter that justifies recognizing that nonemployee as a representative of
the entity for purposes of the privilege—that applying the entity’s
privilege to communications involving the entity’s lawyer and the
nonemployee furthers the purposes of the privilege. That nonemployee
may be an agent of the entity. But the functional equivalent analysis would
not require that agency determination in addition to the functional
equivalent analysis. It is enough that the court finds the requisite
significant relationship. As the Colorado Supreme Court has stated in
Alliance Construction Solutions, Inc. v. Department of Corrections,217 in
the context of a government entity, the privilege protects communications
with the entity’s lawyer when “the information-giver” is “an employee,
agent, or independent contractor with a significant relationship not only to
the governmental entity but also to the transaction that is the subject of the
governmental entity’s need for legal services.”218
Other courts have perceived the need for a broad view of the
functional equivalent analysis.219 For example, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Berisha v. Lawson,220 has used the
functional equivalent analysis more broadly. In Berisha, the plaintiff
claimed the defendant author defamed him in a book published by Simon
& Schuster.221 The plaintiff sought disclosure of communications that
occurred during the pre-publication review involving the author and
attorneys representing the publishing house. The district court held that
Simon & Schuster’s attorney-client privilege protected the
communications even though the author was not an employee of the
publishing house.222

217. 59 P.3d 861 (Colo. 2002).
218. Id. at 869.
219. See, e.g., American Ins. Co. v. Pine Terrace Homeowners Ass’n, 2021 WL
2036541 (D. Colo. May 21, 2021) (applying the Alliance approach).
220. 973 F.3d 1304, 1318 (11th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2424 (2021)
(mem.).
221. See id. at 1308–09. The book was the basis of the movie War Dogs, starring
Jonah Hill and Miles Teller. See id. at 1309.
222. See id. at 1317.
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The Eleventh Circuit, applying New York law, affirmed on this
issue.223 The court viewed the “‘employee equivalent’” doctrine as an
“extension” of the Upjohn decision,224 noting that some courts have held
that the teachings of Upjohn mean that even nonemployees may be
covered by the entity’s attorney-client privilege if the nonemployee “acts
as the functional equivalent of an employee for the relevant matter.”225 The
Berisha court refused to require the nonemployee to be the same as an
employee for purposes of agency or employment law.226 The court noted
that the plaintiff had argued that the functional equivalent doctrine can
only apply when the nonemployee “looks, acts, and smells like a company
employee . . . .”227 The court characterized this argument as resting on the
“premise that, for purposes of New York’s attorney-client privilege law,
the scope of the ‘employee-equivalent’ doctrine is to be understood
similarly to the definition of an ‘employee’ in the context of agency or
employment law.”228 The court rejected such an approach, noting that such
a narrow view “misconceives the purposes underlying the doctrine.”229
Too narrow a view of who can be a representative of a lawyer’s entity
client can “frustrate the attorney’s efforts to formulate sound legal advice
based on information possessed by those directly involved in the
matter.”230 The court then stated:
Bieter’s core holding is thus that the privilege must extend to cover
“nonemployees who possess a significant relationship to the client and
the client’s involvement in the transaction that is the subject of legal
services,” and who therefore “have the relevant information needed by
corporate counsel” to advise the client.231

The Berisha court noted that this approach means that occasionally
nonemployees who do not act like employees as that term may be defined
by other areas of the law must be considered representatives of the client
for purposes of the attorney-client privilege.232 While employee
characteristics “are useful in evaluating the nonemployee’s ‘relationship

223. See id. at 1320–21.
224. Id. at 1317 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)).
225. Id. at 1318 (emphasis removed) (citing In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 937 (8th
Cir. 1994)).
226. See id. at 1318–19.
227. Id. at 1318 (internal quotations omitted).
228. Id. (citing In re Vega, 149 N.E.3d 401, 410–14 (N.Y. 2020)).
229. Berisha, 973 F.3d at 1319.
230. Id.
231. Id. (quoting In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 938 (8th Cir. 1994)).
232. See id. (“By its very nature, this includes individuals whom we might not—for
other purposes in the law—consider to behave as ‘employees’ of the corporation.”) (citing
All. Constr. Sols., Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 54 P.3d 861, 869 (Colo. 2002)).
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to the client,’ an absence of such factors does not necessarily destroy the
application of the doctrine.”233
Turning to the facts before it, the Berisha court noted the defendant
author’s relationship with the publishing house was that he was the author
of the book that was the subject of the entity lawyers’ pre-publication
review and the book was the basis for the plaintiff’s defamation claim.234
The court stated that given that the author was the source of all sourcing
and reference information regarding the book, the author’s relationship to
the entity and the transaction “could hardly be more significant.”235 The
lawyers could not do a proper legal review without the information known
to the author.236 While the author’s relationship with the publishing house
did not “bear many of the hallmarks of a traditional employer-employee
relationship,” they were in a “joint effort to produce a published book to
their mutual satisfaction[.]”237 The contract between them enumerated the
specific obligations of the parties in this regard.238 Thus, the court
concluded that the lower court did not err in finding that the nonemployee
author was a representative of the entity, Simon & Schuster, for purposes
of the publishing house’s attorney-client privilege; the entity’s privilege
protected the communications between the entity’s lawyers and the
nonemployee author.239
The dissenting opinion of Justice Wiggins in Newman v. Highland
School District No. 203240 is also helpful in illustrating the proper and
advantageous use of a fluid functional equivalent analysis to determine
whether a nonemployee has “a sufficient identity of relationship to the
corporation.”241 In Newman, the Washington Supreme Court refused to
apply the school district’s attorney-client privilege to protect
communications involving counsel for the school district and former
employees. The former employees were coaches involved in the incident
233. Id. (citing Bieter, 16 F.3d at 938); see also All. Constr. Sols., 54 P.3d at 869
(“[W]e agree with the Bieter court that a formal distinction between an employee and an
independent contractor conflicts with the purposes supporting the privilege. An
independent contractor with a meaningful relationship to the [entity] may possess
important information needed by the attorney to provide effective representation.”).
234. See Berisha, 973 F.3d at 1319–20.
235. Id. at 1319.
236. See id.
237. Id.
238. See id. at 1320.
239. See id. at 1320; see also Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Marvel Enters.,
No. 01 Civ. 3016, 2002 WL 31556383, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2002) (finding that the
director and writer involved with film were functional equivalents to studio employees);
Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 580 F. Supp. 1082, 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding that the movie
studio’s privilege applied to communications between the studio’s lawyers and the author
of the book that was the basis of the movie).
240. 381 P.3d 1188 (Wash. 2016) (en banc).
241. Id. at 1195 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
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that was the subject of the litigation but who were no longer employees at
the time of the communication with the district’s counsel.242 The Newman
majority refused to apply the entity’s privilege to communications
involving the former employees because they were not in an agency
relationship with the school district when they communicated with the
district’s counsel.243
The dissent in Newman rejected the majority’s employee agent status
requirement,244 noting that a status analysis was the sort of analysis the
Upjohn case rejected when it rejected the control group inquiry for
application of the corporate attorney-client privilege to employees.245 In
the dissent’s view, the Newman majority rejected the functional analysis
framework set forth in Upjohn, stating, “[b]y looking only at the identity
of the former employee, the majority sidesteps around the important
functional analysis contemplated by Upjohn.”246 In so doing the majority
ignored that the purpose of the privilege, “facilitating the flow of relevant
and necessary information from lower-level employees to counsel—was a
key function of the privilege identified by the Court in Upjohn and a
critical reason that Court extended the privilege to lower-level employees
in the first place.”247

242. See id. at 1190 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
243. See id. at 1193 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). See supra Part V.B (discussing
Newman).
244. See Newman, 381 P.3d at 1194–95 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). The dissent
acknowledged that the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers also denies
application of the entity privilege to former employees generally because, absent special
circumstances, they are not agent of the principal at the time they speak with counsel. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2000)
(requiring an ongoing agency relationship at the time of the communication with the
attorney for the corporation or other entity); see also Newman, 381 P.3d at 1198–99.
Regarding the Newman majority’s position as well as the Restatement, the
dissent states:
Temporal concepts associated with the duration of agency, as they relate to the
timing a communication is made to counsel, should not be dispositive of the
privilege, as they bear little relationship to the goals of the privilege identified by
the Supreme Court. It is for this reason that I would also reject the position
articulated in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §73(2) and
comment e that the privilege be limited to those with a present and ongoing
agency relationship with the corporation. Such a position is incompatible with
the Upjohn Court’s focus on the nature of the communications, rather than on
the formalities of the relationship to the corporation.
Newman, 381 P.3d at 1199.
245. Newman, 381 P.3d at 1195 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (“This temporal limitation
is at odds with the functional analysis underlying the decision in Upjohn and ignores the
important purposes and goals that the attorney-client privilege serves.”).
246. Id. at 1196 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s focus on the formalities
of the relationship between the employee and the corporation as the standard for the
attorney-client privilege misses the point of the Upjohn Court’s functional framework.”).
247. Id. at 1197 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
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The Newman dissent embraced the test set forth in Peralta v. Cendant
Corporation248 for identifying former employees who can be
representatives of the entity for purposes of the entity’s privilege. If the
communications with the former employee “‘relate to the former
employee’s conduct and knowledge, or communication with [the entity’s]
counsel, during his or her employment,’”249 then the communication
involving the former employee should be protected by the entity’s
attorney-client privilege assuming all other requirements of the privilege
obtain.250
The Newman dissent also agreed with the Peralta court that each of
the factors discussed in Upjohn need not be present for the individual to
be a representative of the client for purposes of the entity’s privilege; they
were factors, not requirements.251 The Newman dissent noted that the
Peralta correctly focused on the rationale and purpose of the privilege and
whether privilege application furthered that purpose.252 Thus, in both
Peralta and in Newman, opined the dissent, the fact that the former
employees were not directed by management of the entity to speak with
the entity’s counsel should not result in denial of the privilege for the
communication.253
Addressing the Newman majority’s reliance on the lack of an agency
relationship as a basis of its decision, the Newman dissent noted that the
majority inappropriately emphasizes agency characteristics such as an
agent’s duty of loyalty and obedience that should not be important in a
privilege discussion because “they bear little relationship to the goals of
the privilege identified by the Supreme Court.”254 The dissent noted that
the Supreme Court in Upjohn did not discuss the duty of loyalty or
obedience at all, commenting that “[t]he privilege itself is not grounded in
concepts of a duty on behalf of the client to disclose information to its
attorney, just as its extension to lower-level employees is not based on
their duty to provide information to the corporation.”255
248. 190 F.R.D. 38, 41 (D. Conn. 1999).
249. Newman, 381 P.3d at 1198 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (quoting Peralta v. Cendant
Corp., 190 F.R.D. 38, 41 (D. Conn. 1999)).
250. See id. at 1198 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (“The Peralta court that adopted this
test noted it was rejecting a wholesale application of the specific factors identified in
Upjohn because former employees, unlike current employees, were not directed to speak
with corporate counsel at the direction of management.”).
251. See id. at 1198 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (“reject[ing] a wholesale application of
the specific factors identified in Upjohn because former employees, unlike current
employees, were not directed to speak with corporate counsel at the direction of
management”).
252. See id. (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
253. See id. (Wiggins, J., dissenting); Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 190 F.R.D. 38, 41
(D. Conn. 1999).
254. Newman, 381 P.3d at 1199 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 1198 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
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In the Newman dissent’s view, the Newman majority’s emphasis on
agency ignores the fact that the Upjohn Court applied Upjohn’s privilege
to lower-level employees even though those employees were not in the
control group because those individuals’ knowledge and actions can create
legal consequences for the corporation.256 Thus, the corporation’s attorney
should be allowed to access the vital information those employees possess.
In the Newman dissent’s view, that same rationale supports applying the
entity privilege to communications between the entity’s counsel and
former employees since the former employee continues to have that
information and the entity continues to be liable for the past actions and
knowledge of the former employee. The status change does not change the
situation for purposes of the privilege.257
The Newman dissent’s argument applies as well to nonemployees
who were not former employees. If those nonemployees have vital
information that the entity attorney needs to properly advise the entity
client, and if the nonemployee’s relationship with the entity is a significant
relationship, such as when the entity would be responsible for the
nonemployee’s actions, then the entity’s privilege should protect the
communications involving the nonemployee and the entity’s lawyer.
Without doubt, such nonemployees are not simply third-party witnesses.
A nonemployee with a significant relationship with the entity may
have a different role and have different characteristics in different
contexts. A court may apply the entity’s privilege to former employees by
recognizing the earlier employee relationship at the time the individual
obtained the relevant information as evidence of a significant relationship.
The entity, after all, is likely responsible for the former employees’ actions
during the employment. In many situations, a nonemployee who has the
vital information is a member of the entity team on an ongoing basis, not
simply a one-time project basis such that a court can conclude that the
relationship between the entity and the nonemployee is truly significant.
A nonemployee engaged to assist with an isolated litigation matter
likely would not have such a significant relationship. So, for example, if a
corporation has litigation on the horizon as the result of a cyberattack and
that entity contracts with a media relations firm to assist with the
presentation of the corporation’s situation to the public, communications
between the attorney and the employees of the public relations firm should
not be protected by the entity’s privilege. The public relations firm’s
employees are not the source of information about the cyberattack needed
by the entity’s lawyer as an initial matter, and secondly, they do not have
a significant relationship with the entity client or the cyberattack. Thus,

256. See id. at 1198–99 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
257. See id. at 1199 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
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the public relations firm’s employees are not properly representatives of
the entity client for purposes of the entity’s privilege, though they may be
agents of the entity for other purposes.258
In contrast, a nonemployee information technology specialist who
has worked every day for two years embedded in the corporation’s
environment whether or not physically working “at” or “in” the entity is
likely a corporate insider, a nonemployee with a significant relationship
with the entity, if the specialist’s job included matters related to the
cyberattack. Such a nonemployee may have information vital to the
lawyer’s representation of the entity. The corporation’s attorney-client
privilege should apply to that nonemployee’s communications with the
corporation’s lawyer about the cyberattack.
A bright-line rule that excludes all nonemployees such as the
nonemployee information technology specialist in this example is too
strict a rule to accomplish the goals of the privilege. A bright-line rule that
includes the nonemployee public relations specialist is too broad a rule—
it perhaps accomplishes the goals of the privilege but at too great a cost.
The courts must keep the privilege “contained within appropriate
boundaries”259 and be mindful of the purpose of the privilege. The
significance of the nonemployee’s relationship with the entity is the
regulator of the privilege’s boundary.
IX. CONCLUSION
In the years since the United States Supreme Court decided Upjohn
Company v. United States,260 courts have struggled with the question of
whether an entity’s attorney-client privilege can protect communications
between the entity’s lawyer and a nonemployee who has information the
entity’s lawyer needs to best advise the entity. During this same time,
entities such as corporations have incorporated nonemployees in their
enterprise in all sorts of roles.
In an attempt to address this issue, courts have developed a functional
equivalent analysis. Some courts have applied this analysis so that a
nonemployee cannot be a representative of the entity client unless the
nonemployee is the functional equivalent of an entity employee. Some
courts have focused on whether the nonemployee has traits, that, in these
courts’ sometimes misguided opinions, are traits of employees. Some
courts have required that the nonemployee have an even narrower set of
258. See, e.g., Behunin v. Superior Ct., 9 Cal. App. 5th 833, 852–53 (Cal. Ct. App.
2017) (finding that a public relations consultant engaged to assist with the matter was not
a functional equivalent).
259. Union Carbide Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 1036, 1046 (D. Del.
1985).
260. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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traits that, if required of employees, would be incompatible with the
Upjohn opinion regarding employees.
A functional equivalent analysis that focuses on required traits of an
entity employee in an employment law sense is becoming more and more
useless as each day of the twenty-first century unfolds. The reality of
entities of the twenty-first century is that nonemployees often have roles
that employees had only a few years in the past. In addition, traits of
employees, especially in post-pandemic times, may not match an
employee definition based on earlier times. In any case, characteristics of
the nonemployee that are important for employment law purposes
generally do not relate logically with the entity’s attorney-client privilege
and its underlying rationale. In addition, the relationship of the functional
equivalent analysis, as many courts have applied it, to agency principles is
also problematic.
A rational functional equivalent analysis consistent with the goals
and rationale of the attorney-client privilege for entities such as
corporations must focus on two issues. First, the analysis must focus on
whether the nonemployee is a source of information integral to the entity
lawyer’s representation of the entity. Second, the analysis must focus on
whether the nonemployee has a significant relationship with the entity—a
relationship of closeness similar to the relationship an employee has to an
employer. The focus is not on whether the nonemployee is the functional
equivalent of an employee. The question is whether the nonemployee’s
relationship with the entity is the functional equivalent of an employee’s
relationship with the entity. Is the nonemployee a member of the team? Is
the nonemployee an entity insider? Is this a situation in which the
nonemployee can bind the entity or the entity is responsible for the
nonemployee’s statements or actions?
If the nonemployee has the information important to the
representation and if the nonemployee has a significant relationship with
the entity, then the nonemployee can be a representative of the entity client
for purposes of the entity’s attorney-client privilege. Thus, the entity’s
privilege can protect communications between the lawyer for the entity
and the nonemployee.
The determination of whether the nonemployee has the sort of
information the entity’s lawyer needs to represent the entity should not be
a difficult one. The matter before the court and the relationship the
nonemployee has to that matter should provide the answer to the court.
Whether the nonemployee has a significant relationship with the
entity can be more complex. What that relationship might look like will
vary from case to case. Economic entities of the post-pandemic twentyfirst century are many and varied; their methods of staffing and pursuing
their goals are varied as well. Yet, a court can, in the exercise of wizened
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judgment honed on the bench, discern significant relationships from lesser
ones. A court can discern whether a nonemployee is so involved with the
entity and the matter as to be considered a member of the entity team who
should be viewed as a representative of the entity client for purposes of the
privilege. A court can also, in contrast, discern that the nonemployee does
not have a significant relationship with the entity and thus should be
viewed as simply a fact witness whose communications with the entity’s
counsel are in no way protected by the entity’s privilege. Such a functional
equivalent analysis is no more complex that the multi-factor analysis the
Supreme Court embraced in the Upjohn opinion for determining
employees who are representative of the entity client for privilege
purposes.261
In the process of using the functional equivalent analysis to determine
whether a particular nonemployee is a representative of the entity client
for purposes of the entity privilege, a court need not analyze agency. A
nonemployee may very well be an agent of the entity for some purposes.
Yet, the relevant question for privilege purposes is whether the
nonemployee is a representative of the entity client—whether there is a
significant relationship. As explained by the dissent in Newman v.
Highland School District No. 203,262 agency characteristics such as the
duties of loyalty and obedience “bear little relationship to the goals of the
privilege identified by the Supreme Court.”263
A focus on the significance of the relationship also provides
consistency of analysis across all kinds of nonemployees, whether they be
former employees or nonemployees who have never been employees.
With a focus on the relationship, a former employee can be a
representative of the entity client if that former employee has the requisite
information and the relationship between the entity and the former
employee is significant. For many courts, the fact that the former employee
was once an employee and gained the information while in that status
would provide evidence of a significant relationship. Such would be
especially true if the employer is responsible legally for the
nonemployee’s words or actions.
A functional equivalent analysis as described here is consistent with
the goals of the entity privilege as stated by the Supreme Court in Upjohn.
Also importantly, this approach to a functional equivalent analysis can be
applied to the many forms economic enterprise takes today and may take
in the future.

261. See supra Part IV (discussing Upjohn).
262. 381 P.3d 1188 (Wash. 2016) (en banc).
263. Id. at 1199.

